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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over attorney discipline pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution. See Utah Const, art. VIII, § 4 ("The
Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice
law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law."). Direct appeal
of an informal order of the Ethics and Discipline Committee is provided by Supreme
Court Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(f) (effective November 1, 2009). In the event
Rule 14-510(f) is deemed inapplicable to this matter, review is sought as a Petition for
Extraordinary Relief under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 19 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure where "no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy
is available."1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW,
AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY
Petitioner Larry N. Long asserts the following issues on appeal:
I.

The Ethics and Discipline Committee Failed to Articulate Findings of Fact
Which Would Justify Its Conclusions of Law.
A.

Standard of Review:

1

On November 1, 2009, Rule of Professional Practice 14-510 was amended to provide
for direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from informal proceedings before the Ethics
and Discipline Committee. The Order of Discipline in each matter below was issued
after the effective date of the amended Rule. However, proceedings were conducted
prior to the effective date of the amended Rule. As set forth in Long's Motion to Clarify
Procedure for Review, deferred for plenary consideration, it is unclear whether the new
direct appeal procedure is to apply to matters pending, or only to matters originating after
the effective date of the amendment. Long asserts that Rule 14-510, as amended, applies
to this matter.
5
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"Judicial discipline and lawyer discipline in particular, are essentially original
proceedings here. In the case of lawyer discipline, the authority to discipline lawyers
rests entirely with this court and is delegated by our rules to the Utah State Bar for some
functions, and to the district courts for others. . . .

In both cases, they act under our

original authority, and matters eventually brought to us for action come not as appeals,
but by way of final confirmation or rejection of actions taken by our delegees." In re
Anderson, 2004 UT 7, Tf 46, 82 P.3d 1334 (internal citations omitted).
B.

Preservation:

Long preserved this issue by filing an Exception to the recommendation of
discipline in each case, in accordance with Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(c). See
Exceptions to Screening Panel's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommendations for Public Reprimand, Case No. 07-0497 (hereinafter "Shepard
Exceptions Brief), p.7-9; Exceptions to Screening Panel's Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Recommendations for Public Reprimand, Case No. 08-0049 (hereinafter
"Nelson Exceptions Brief), p.7-9; Exceptions to Screening Panel's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations for Public Reprimand, Case No. 08-0080
(hereinafter "Henroid2 Exceptions Brief), p.7-11. 3

2

Because Judge Henroid did not to submit a verified, notarized complaint, Judge Henroid
is not considered the complainant in OPC File No. 08-0080. Rather, the OPC is the
official complainant. However, because Judge Henroid's letter prompted the OPC's
investigation and is the origin of this matter, we refer to OPC File No. 08-0080 as the
"Henroid matter" for clarity.
6
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II.

The Screening Panel's Recommendation Was Not Based Upon Substantial
Evidence.
A.

Standard of Review:

"In reviewing cases involving attorney discipline, we 'review the trial court's
findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard/ but 'reserve the right to draw
different inferences from the facts than those drawn by the trial court.'" In re Discipline
of Crawley, 2007 UT 44, \ 17, 164 P.3d 1232 (quoting In re Discipline oflnce, 957 P.2d
1233, 1236 (Utah 1998)); see also In re Discipline ofSchwenke, 849 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah
1993) (stating that factual findings are sustained so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence).
B.

Preservation:

Long preserved this issue by filing an Exception to the recommendation of
discipline in each case, in accordance with Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(c). See
Shepard Exceptions Brief, p.4-7; Nelson Exceptions Brief, p.4-6; Henroid Exceptions
Brief, p 4-7.
III.

The Screening Panel Misinterpreted the Rules of Professional Conduct
Erroneously Finding Violations of Rules 1.5 (a), 3.1, 5.3(a), 5.5(a), and 8.4(a).
A.

Standard of Review:

A court's interpretation of the rules of professional conduct is reviewed for
correctness. In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, ^f 12, 86 P. 3d 712; Nemelka v.
The record filed with the court was not consecutively paginated across all three OPC
matters. Per discussions with the clerk of the court and by agreement of counsel,
documents which may be found in the record compiled by the Screening Panel will be
identified by OPC matter using the numbering system of the Screening Panel's record
(i.e. "Shepard R. 000187"). Documents which postdate the Screening Panel's record will
be identified by OPC matter and document name (i.e. "Nelson Exceptions Brief, p. 3").
7
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Ethics & Discipline Comm. of the Utah Supreme Court, 2009 UT 33, | 9, 210 P.3d 525
("We therefore afford no deference to a panel chair's interpretation of our rules.").
B.

Preservation:

Long preserved this issue by filing an Exception to the recommendation of
discipline in each case, in accordance with Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(c). See
Shepard Exceptions Brief, p.9-13; Nelson Exceptions Brief, p.9-21; Henroid Exceptions
Brief, p.l 1-13.
IV.

The Screening Panel's Disciplinary Recommendations, Including
Recommended Discipline for Violating Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d), Are Improper
and Inconsistent.
A.

Standard of Review:

In re Doncouse, 2004 UT 77, 1 10, 99 P.3d 837 ("It is our duty to make an
independent determination as to the appropriate sanction to be imposed."); In re
Discipline of Harding, 2004 UT 100, ^ 12, 104 P.3d 1220 ("In determining an
appropriate sanction, this court is free to examine all relevant facts and circumstances and
is under no obligation to defer to the conclusions of any other body.").
B.

Preservation:

Long preserved this issue by filing an Exception to the recommendation of
discipline in each case, in accordance with Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(c). See
Shepard Exceptions Brief, p. 12-15; Nelson Exceptions Brief, p. 12-13; Henroid
Exceptions Brief, p. 13-15.

8
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DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following rules are fully set forth in the Addendum to Brief of Petitioner,
submitted herewith:
Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(b)(7) (formerly 14-510(b)(5).
Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(f)(5).
Rule of Professional Practice 14-602(d).
Rule of Professional Practice 14-605(d).
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a).
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1.
Rule of Professional Conduct 5.3(a).
Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5(a).
Rule of Professional Conduct 7.1.
Rule of Professional Conduct 7.5(d).
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This petition seeks review of and relief from an Order of Discipline: Admonition
(OPC File No. 07-0497—Shepard) and an Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand (OPC
File No. 08-0049—Nelson) issued by Respondent Ethics and Discipline Committee of
the Utah Supreme Court (the "Committee") on November 13, 2009, and an Order of
Discipline: Public Reprimand (OPC File No. 08-0080—Henroid) issued by Respondent
on November 24, 2009.
B.

Course of the Proceedings
9
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1.

On October 3, 2007, the Office of Professional Conduct of the Utah State

Bar ("OPC") mailed to Long a Notice of Informal Complaint in OPC File No. 07-0497.
(See Shepard R. 000065.) On September 9, 2008, OPC mailed to Long a Notice of
Informal Complaint in OPC File No. 08-0049. (See Nelson R. 000066.) On March 4,
2008, OPC mailed to Long a Notice of Informal Complaint in OPC File No. 08-0080.
(See Henroid R. 000038.)
2.

Long timely responded to each Notice of Informal Complaint.

(See

Shepard R. 000070; Nelson R. 000078; Henroid R. 000053.) On February 19, 2009, a
Screening Panel hearing was held on all three matters.4
3.

On May 21, 2009, the Screening Panel issued its Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Admonition in OPC File No.
07-0497 (hereinafter "Shepard Recommendation").
4.

On July 2, 2009, the Screening Panel issued its Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Public Reprimand in OPC File
No. 08-0049 (hereinafter "Nelson Recommendation").
5.

On June 10, 2009, the Screening Panel issued its Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Public Reprimand in OPC File
No. 08-0080 (hereinafter "Henroid Recommendation").
6.

Long timely

filed

Exceptions to

each

of the

Screening

Panel

Recommendations on or about July 1, 2009. After retaining new counsel and with
4

Concerned about the potential prejudicial effect of three disciplinary complaints being
presented to the Screening Panel at one time, Long requested that separate hearings be
scheduled. (Shepard R. 000239-45.) This request was denied. (Shepard R. 000232-38.)
10

permission from OPC, Long submitted new Exceptions in each matter on October 22,
2009.
7.

A consolidated hearing on Exceptions before the Chair of the Ethics and

Discipline Committee, Bruce Maak, was held October 28, 2009.
8.

On November 6, 2009, Mr. Maak issued a Ruling on Exception to

Screening Panel Recommendation of Discipline in OPC File Nos. 07-0497 and 08-0049
(hereinafter "Shepard Exceptions Ruling" and "Nelson Exceptions Ruling" respectively).
The Ruling on Exception to Screening Panel Recommendation of Discipline in OPC File
Nos. 08-0080 was issued November 17, 2009 (hereinafter "Henroid Exceptions Ruling").
9.

An Order of Discipline: Admonition in OPC File No. 07-0497 and an Order

of Discipline: Public Reprimand in OPC File No. 08-0049 were issued by the Committee
on November 13, 2009 (hereinafter "Shepard Order" and "Nelson Order" respectively).
An Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand in OPC File No. 08-0080 was issued on
November 24, 2009 (hereinafter "Henroid Order").
10.

On December 8, 2009, Long filed a Petition for Review or Petition for

Extraordinary Relief for each Order of Discipline. Long also filed a Motion to Clarify
Procedure for Review and a Motion to Consolidate for proposes of review before the
Supreme Court. The Motion to Consolidate was granted on January 7, 2010. The
Motion to Clarify was deferred for plenary consideration on January 19, 2010.
11.

On December 22, 2009, Long filed a Motion for Stay for each matter,

seeking to stay publication of any notice of disciplinary action against Long in the Utah
Bar Journal. The Motions for Stay were denied on January 18, 2010.
11
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C.

Disposition at agency

Following exhaustion of internal review within the Committee, an Order of
Discipline: Admonition was issued in the Shepard matter on November 13, 2009. An
Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand was issued in the Nelson matter on November 13,
2009 and in the Henroid matter on November 24, 2009.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Shepard Complaint: OPC File No. 07-0497:

1.

On October 3, 2007, OPC mailed to Long a Notice of Informal Complaint

in OPC File No. 07-0497, arising from Long's representation of Steven Shepard. (See
Shepard R. 000065.)
2.

Long initially met with Shepard after regular business hours, accompanied

Shepard to Pretrial Services and court the next morning, and prepared for and attended a
subsequent hearing. (Shepard R. 000071-73, 000207-213.) At the initial consultation,
Long discussed with Shepard the immediate and potential consequences of his legal
problem, goals of representation, and terms of payment. (See Shepard R. 000070-71.)
3.

Long reviewed the retainer agreement with Shepard in detail.

Shepard

initialed each paragraph and signed the agreement following the hearing the next
morning. (Shepard R. 000196-97, 000209-10.) Shepard indicated that he did not believe
he had hired Long, though he admitted to signing the retainer agreement. (Shepard R.
000197-98.) Long believed he had been retained by Shepard. (Shepard R. 000210.) At

12
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the conclusion of the initial consultation, Shepard paid Long $100 to secure his
representation the following morning. (Shepard R. 000194.)
4.

After being unable to come up with the money to pay Long's entire fee,

Shepard testified that he contacted Long's office and told a secretary he had hired
someone else. (Shepard R. 000198.) Later, Shepard received notice that he was being
sued by a collection agent for Long's fee. (Shepard R. 000198-99.)
5.

The retainer agreement specifies the scope of representation and indicates

that Long's flat fee for services is considered earned once substantial services have been
performed by Long. Shepard initialed alongside each paragraph of the agreement.
(Shepard R. 000097-99.) Shepard also signed a Flat Fee Payment Arrangement &
Promissory Note, (Shepard R. 000103-04), and a Representation Requirements
document. (Shepard R. 000106-07.)
6.

Long continued to work on Shepard's case, preparing for and attending

another hearing a few weeks later. Upon arriving at the subsequent hearing, Long first
became aware that Shepard had retained a different attorney. (Shepard R. 000211.)
Shepard acknowledged at the hearing that Long attended the subsequent hearing,
apparently unaware that he had been terminated. (Shepard R. 000204-05.)
7.

Long spent an approximate total of 6 hours on Shepard's case. (Shepard R.

000213.)
8.

According to Long's testimony, the collection action against Shepard was

filed by Express Recovery after it received a copy of the signed retainer agreement from
Long's office. After Shepard contacted Long's office and protested the lawsuit, Long
13
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directed Express Recovery to cease their collection action. Shepard never paid Long
anything beyond the initial $100 for services provided, which included after-hours initial
consultation with Shepard, preparation of a court filing due that same day, preparation
that same evening for a hearing the following morning, assistance at Pretrial Services the
next morning, an and an appearance on behalf of Shepard at a hearing shortly thereafter
which resulted in a positive result for Shepard. (Shepard R. 000194, 000200.)
9.

The Screening Panel issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

Recommendation of Discipline, recommending an Order of Discipline: Admonition for
violations of Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(a), regarding unreasonable fees; 3.1,
regarding bringing an unmeritorious claim; 7.1 and 7.5(d), regarding use of a misleading
firm name; and 8.4(a), misconduct. (See Shepard Recommendation, p.l.) A copy of the
Shepard Recommendation is included in the Addendum hereto.
10.

The Screening Panel also considered as a mitigating factor that Long did

not actually collect the full flat fee from Shepard, but instead resolved the dispute by
directing the collections company to drop its claim. (See Shepard Recommendation, p.5.)
11.

In Exceptions proceedings, the Chair of the Committee, Bruce Maak,

acknowledged that the Screening Panel's Findings of Fact do not enumerate the facts
upon which the Screening Panel's decision was based. (See Shepard Exceptions Ruling,
p.4 n.l.) Nevertheless, the Chair concluded that sufficient evidence did exist in the

14
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record to sustain the Screening Panel's recommendation.

(See Shepard Exceptions

Ruling, pp.4-7.)5
B.

Nelson Complaint: OPC File No. 08-0049:

12.

On October 3, 2007, OPC mailed to Long a Notice of Informal Complaint

in OPC File No. 07-0497, arising from Long's representation of David Merritt. (See
Nelson R. 000065.) Gordon Nelson, Merritt's employer who arranged for Merritt's legal
defense, is the actual complainant in this matter.
13.

Nelson's complaint alleged that Nelson paid a $750 retainer and signed a

fee agreement arranging for Long's representation of Merritt. (See Nelson R. 000001.)
Nelson alleged that Long failed to appear as agreed on Merritt's behalf, and failed to
adequately represent Merritt. (See Nelson R. 000001-02.)
14.

Nelson claimed that Long's employee, Joe Scheeler, assured Nelson that

Long would represent Merritt.

After a second missed hearing, Nelson claims that

Scheeler said he would handle the matter himself.
15.

(See Nelson R. 000002.)

Long appeared at hearings on behalf of Merritt and also prepared various

documents for Merritt's cases. (See Nelson R. 000129-210, 000231-236.) Scheeler was
an employee of Long's firm who assisted with administrative tasks and client intake.

5

As discussed in Part I, infra, the Chair went to great lengths to muster scattered facts
from the record and articulate a line of reasoning that the Screening Panel could have
followed in order to arrive at its conclusions. However, it is important to note that the
duty to state the basis of the Screening Panel's recommendation lies with the Screening
Panel at the time the Panel makes its recommendation. See Rules of Professional
Practice 14-510(b)(7), (9) (formerly 14-510(b)(5)(D), (E)).
675 :425618vl

15

Scheeler, pursuant to his employment agreement, was to comply with the Rules of
Professional Conduct. (See Nelson R. 000112.)
16.

Long was retained to represent Merritt in two criminal matters before the

North Salt Lake Justice Court. Long appeared in these matters and later attempted to
withdraw.

When his motion to withdraw was denied, Long continued to represent

Merritt until substituted by another attorney. (See Nelson R. 000129-210, 000231-236,
000251.) During the same time period, Merritt was also involved in criminal and civil
matters before the Second and Third District Courts. Long was not engaged to represent
Merritt in these matters. (See Nelson R. 000082-89.)
17.

Nelson paid $1,850 to Long's office to retain Long. Ultimately, Long's

representation of Merritt was terminated. (See Nelson R. 000238-39.) Although Long
believes he earned the money paid, all funds were later refunded to Merritt. (See Nelson
R. 000127.)
18.

At the Screening Panel hearing on this matter, substantial discussion

centered around Long's 10-page employment agreement with Scheeler.

(Unofficial

Transcript of Nelson Screening Panel Hearing ("Nelson Transcript"), p.7.)6

Upon deciding to file exceptions to the Screening Panel's recommendations, Mr. Long
obtained the official recording of the Screening Panel hearings and submitted the same to
CitiCourt for transcription. CitiCourt made certified transcriptions of the Shepard and
Henroid matter, which are found in the record. However, CitiCourt reported that the
recording quality of the Nelson matter was too poor to make a substantial transcription.
In an effort to recreate some record of the evidence against Mr. Long, administrative
personnel in attorney Charles Gruber's office transcribed as much of the Nelson hearing
as could be heard and understood from the recording. This unofficial transcript was
submitted with Mr. Long's Exception to the Nelson Recommendation, and is found in the
record.
16

19.

The employment agreement with Scheeler specifically provided that

Scheeler was to notify clients that he is not a lawyer and was to refrain from extending
legal advice. (Nelson Transcript, pp.4-5.) Nelson acknowledged in his complaint that
Long "told my wife and David that Joe did not have a license to practice law in any
way." (Nelson R. 000002.) Long primarily uses paralegals and non-lawyer assistants for
client intake and screening, as well as for administrative support. (Nelson Transcript,
p.3.) Clients were given a disclosure which indicated that non-lawyer assistants were not
lawyers and could not give legal advice. (Nelson Transcript, p.3.)
20.

Referencing the allegation that Scheeler appeared on behalf of clients, Long

recounted that on one occasion, Long was delayed in getting to the courthouse for a
hearing on Merritt's behalf. Scheeler, who was present at the courthouse with Merritt,
offered to "appear" at the hearing on behalf of Long. Long explicitly told Scheeler to
inform the judge and the prosecutor that he was not a lawyer and explain Long's delay.
Scheeler did so and the court rescheduled the hearing for a new date. (Nelson Transcript,
pp.7-8.) The relevant dockets to not indicate that Scheeler ever appeared before the
court. (Nelson R. 000046-65, 000231-236.)
21.

At one point, Long discovered Scheeler conducting an unauthorized

mediation after hours and reaffirmed to Scheeler that such was unacceptable under the
terms of their employment agreement.

(Nelson Transcript, pp.4-5, 10.)

Scheeler

allegedly conducted a mediation without Long's knowledge, and prepared a document
memorializing the parties' agreement. (Nelson Transcript, pp.5-6; Nelson R. 000002,
000025-30).
17
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22.

Scheeler was admonished and reprimanded by Long for overstepping his

role as a paralegal assistant. Eventually, the employment relationship with Scheeler was
terminated due to disagreement regarding the bounds of Scheeler's authority, his
adherence to the terms and conditions of his employment contract, and his conduct in the
workplace. (Nelson Transcript, p.6, 10.)
23-

The Screening Panel issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

Recommendation of Discipline, recommending an Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand
for alleged violations of Rules of Professional Conduct 5.3(a), regarding failure to take
measures to ensure employee conduct in compliance with the Rules; 5.5(a), regarding
failure to supervise employees; and 8.4(a), misconduct. (See Nelson Recommendation,
p.l.) A copy of the Nelson Recommendation is included in the Addendum hereto.
24.

In Exceptions proceedings, the Chair of the Committee, Bruce Maak,

acknowledged that the Screening Panel's Findings of Fact lack "evidentiary detail," but
maintained that they were sufficient. (See Nelson Exceptions Ruling, p.6.) The Chair
also concluded that sufficient evidence did exist in the record to sustain the Screening
Panel's recommendation. (See Nelson Exceptions Ruling, p.2-8.)
C.

Henroid Complaint: OPC File No. 08-0080:

25.

On March 4, 2008, OPC mailed to Long a Notice of Informal Complaint in

OPC File No. 08-0080, arising from Long's representation of Annallicia Vantreese, Mark
Leroy Kenney, and Jose Luis Perez-Hernandez. (See Henroid R. 000038.)
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26.

The informal complaint was prompted by a letter from Judge Stephen L.

Henroid, who reported that each client had been overcharged for legal services by Long,
who he believed performed insubstantial work before withdrawing from each case. (See
Henroid R. 000001.) None of the clients who are the subject of Judge Henroid's concern
have complained of Long's representation.
27.

Long contends that his representation of each client was complete and

diligent, and that he earned the flat fee charged in each case.

Long worked

approximately 45 hours on the Vantreese matter, 10 hours on the Kenney matter, and 5060 hours on the Perez-Hernandez matter. (Henroid R. 000059, 000599-600.)
28.

Most of Long's work on behalf of each client was completed outside the

courtroom. Thus, Judge Henroid may have been unaware of the full extent of Long's
work on behalf of each client. (Henroid R. 000668.)
29.

Long made numerous

appearances

in each case, filed

motions,

corresponded with opposing counsel, reviewed documents and evidence and conducted
research, and counseled each client regarding their legal and personal problems and goals
of representation. (Henroid R. 000002-35, 00064-78, 000095-105, 000127-253, 00027889, 000303-09, 000326-46, 000370-485, 000499-525, 000533-534, 000540.)
30.

The retainer agreement for each client specifies the scope of representation

and indicates that Long's flat fee for services is considered earned once substantial
services have been performed. Each client signed the retainer agreement. (Henroid R.
000085-87, 000318-22, 000487-490.) Kenney and Perez-Hernandez also signed a Flat
Fee Payment Arrangement & Promissory Note, while Vantreese paid in full. (Henroid R.
19
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000103-04, 000323-24, 000494-95.)

Each signed a Representation Requirements

document. (HenroidR. 000081-82, 000320-21, 000492-93.)
31.

Flat fees are appropriate and customary in Utah for criminal matters, and

Long's rates are comparable to those of other criminal defense attorneys in the area.
(Henroid R. 000060, 000601, 000676-77. See also Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion No.
136 (1993).)
32.

No evidence was presented at the hearing that flat fees were inappropriate

under the circumstances, or that Long's flat fee was unreasonable. Aside from testimony
presented by Long, no testimony, expert or otherwise, was offered that would establish
what would be a reasonable fee for the services performed by Long.
33.

Attorneys customarily do not attend drug court hearings unless some sort of

problem is anticipated. (Henroid R. 000636-39, 000658-59.) Long remained involved in
each case, and remained available to counsel each client until the conclusion of their legal
matter or termination of the attorney-client relationship.

(Henroid R. 000640-41,

000660.)
34.

Judge Henroid appears to have been mistaken regarding several acts alleged

in his letter. For example, Judge Henroid mistakenly complained that Long withdrew
from all three cases, leaving the clients to the Legal Defender's Association.

(See

Henroid R. 000038.) In fact, Long remained involved in two of the three cases to their
conclusion, and was terminated by the third client. (Henroid R. 000640-41, 000660,
000664-65.)
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35.

Regarding the firm name issue, Long is presently a solo practitioner, but

has employed additional attorneys at his firm from time to time. (Henroid R. 000606609.) Long also occasionally associates with other attorneys in the area, although not as
employees. (Henroid R. 000607.) While at all times relevant to this matter there were no
additional attorneys employed by Long, no one ever represented to clients that there were
multiple attorneys at the firm and clients were consistently informed that only Long
would be their lawyer. (Henroid R. 000609-610.)7 No testimony at the hearing or other
evidence in the record indicates that any client or member of the public has been misled
in this regard.
36.

The Screening Panel issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

Recommendation of Discipline, recommending an Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand
for alleged violations of Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(a), regarding unreasonable
fees; 7.1 and 7.5(d), regarding use of a misleading firm name; and 8.4(a), misconduct.
(See Henroid Recommendation, p.l.)

A copy of the Henroid Recommendation is

included in the Addendum hereto.
37.

The Screening Panel made no findings of fact regarding the amounts

actually charged by Long or the nature and extent of the work completed by him for each
client. See Addendum, Exhibit I.
38.

In Exceptions proceedings, the Chair of the Committee, Bruce Maak,

acknowledged that the Screening Panel's Findings of Fact lack "evidentiary detail" and
7

Although the firm name issue arises in each of the three matters below, it was only
discussed during the portion of the Screening Panel Hearing which concerned the
Henroid matter.
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indicated that the findings do not "articulate the specific evidence that the Screening
Panel believed and disbelieved and the analytical process by which the Panel came" to its
conclusion. (See Henroid Exceptions Ruling, p.6.) Nevertheless, Mr. Maak concluded
that the findings were sufficient. (See Henroid Exceptions Ruling, pp.2-11.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In ordering discipline against Petitioner Larry N. Long, the Committee adopted the
Screening Panel's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of
Discipline in each matter. However, in each matter the Screening Panel's disciplinary
recommendation is improper. In arriving at its recommendation, the Screening Panel did
not adequately articulate findings of fact which would justify its conclusions of law as
required by the Rules of Professional Practice, failed to arrive at a decision based upon
the substantial evidence in the record, misinterpreted the relevant Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct, and recommended discipline which is unreasonable and
inconsistent with discipline imposed for similar offenses and the stated purpose of the
Rules of Professional Practice. Accordingly, each Order of Discipline is unfounded and
improper.
ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized "that there is a presumption of innocence
in a disciplinary proceeding involving a license to practice law." In re Macfarlane, 350
P.2d 631, 637 (Utah 1960). Rule 14-517 of the Rules of Professional Practice places the
burden upon the OPC to prove a complaint of misconduct by a preponderance of the
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evidence. In the present case, the evidence simply does not support a finding that Long
violated Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(a), 3.1, 5.3(a), or 5.5(a), and the
circumstances of Long's violation of Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) do not warrant the sanction
imposed. Moreover, the findings and conclusions relied upon by the Committee fail to
afford Long due process of law required by the Rules of Professional Practice and this
Court's prior decisions.
I.

The Ethics and Discipline Committee Failed to Articulate Findings of Fact
Which Would Justify Its Conclusions of Law:
Due process requires that Long be apprised of the charges and facts against him.

See Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455
(1985) (noting that due process requires a disciplinary board "to explain the evidence
relied upon"). Similarly, Rule 14-510(b)(7) of the Rules of Professional Practice requires
that after the Screening Panel reviews all the facts developed by the informal complaint,
answer, investigation and hearing, the Screening Panel is to then make a recommendation
for public reprimand in writing, stating "the substance and nature of the informal
complaint and defenses and the basis upon which the screening panel has concluded,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent should be admonished or
publicly reprimanded."

Rules of Professional Practice 14-510(b)(7) (formerly 14-

510(b)(5)(E) (emphasis added). In each matter, the Screening Panel failed to state the
facts upon which it based its conclusions, articulating no specific facts and citing no
specific evidence from the record to support each conclusion.
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Indeed, most of the

Findings of Fact are stated not as facts supporting a conclusion, but as conclusions
themselves.
According to Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(d)(3) (formerly 14-510(c)), a
respondent must be given the opportunity to show that the Screening Panel's
recommendation "is unsupported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious,
legally insufficient or otherwise clearly erroneous." The Utah Supreme Court has held
that in cases of attorney disciplinary proceedings, "the seriousness of alleged violations
of a lawyer's professional responsibility requires that a lawyer be afforded an opportunity
to defend his or her good professional standing." Nemelka, 2009 UT 33, ^| 19; see also
Harding, 2004 UT 100,fflf20-21 (holding that a written report of the Screening Panel's
findings and conclusions must be given to the lawyer to ensure due process to the lawyer
accused of misconduct.).
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that factual findings of the bar are treated
"much the same as findings of administrative agencies." Schwenke, 849 P.2dt 576. In
the agency context, Utah appellate courts have held that due process requires a tribunal's
decision to be supported by findings of fact sufficient to permit review. See Milne Truck
Lines v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986) ("It is also
essential that the [agency] make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the critical
subordinate factual issues are highlighted and resolved in such a fashion as
to demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions. . . .");
LaSal Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl Quality, 843 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
("An administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of law that are
24
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adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review."). This basic principle
of due process is repeated in other contexts as well. See Mosdell v. Mosdell, 2001 UT
App 115, % 4 ("Here, the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are
insufficient to support its order . . . .

With such meager findings, this court cannot

meaningfully review whether the trial court abused its discretion."); State v. Pharris, 846
P.2d 454, 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the need to review a decision for
correctness requires that a trial court create a complete record, and that "merely
recording] incomplete, conclusory statements in its findings of fact" required the court to
remand the case for an evidentiary hearing); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 478
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a trial court's findings of fact merely reflected the
court's desire to arrive at the necessary conclusions of law, the court found the statements
conclusory and insufficient because they "provide no insight into the evidentiary basis for
the trial court's decision and render effective appellate review unfeasible").
In the matters at issue, Long is denied the ability to adequately defend his good
professional standing.

Without knowing the basis of the Screening Panel's

recommendation, Long is impeded in contesting the substance of the recommendation.
In each Ruling on Exceptions, Mr. Maak concedes that the findings of fact lack
"evidentiary detail." Shepard Exceptions Ruling, p.4 n.l; Nelson Exceptions Ruling, p.6;
Henroid Exceptions Ruling, p.6. While the term "evidentiary detail" is never explained,
Mr. Maak does elaborate in the Henroid Exceptions Ruling that the findings do not
"articulate the specific evidence that the Screening Panel believed and disbelieved and
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the analytical process by which the Panel came" to its conclusion. Henroid Exceptions
Ruling, p.6. Mr. Maak concludes that this level of detail is not required. Id. p.6-7.
Long asserts that the level of detail excused by Mr. Maak is precisely what is
required by the Rules and by due process. Proper findings of fact should contain "those
facts on each issue which are necessary to make flow from them the law conclusion or
make such law conclusions intelligible." Sandall v. Hoskins, 137 P.2d 819, 822 (Utah
1943). As this Court explained in Milne Truck Lines:
The importance of complete, accurate, and consistent findings of fact is
essential to a proper determination by an administrative agency. To that
end, findings should be sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions of mixed law and fact, are
reached. Without such findings, this Court cannot perform its duty of
reviewing the Commission's order in accordance with established legal
principles and of protecting the parties and the public from arbitrary and
capricious administrative action.
720P.2datl378.
In each Exceptions Ruling, Mr. Maak goes to great lengths to gather scattered
facts from the record and offer a line of reasoning that the Screening Panel could have
followed in order to arrive at its conclusions. For example, in the Shepard Exceptions
Ruling, Mr. Maak justifies the Screening Panel's decision by referring to evidence that
"the Panel believed or could have believed"
added).

Shepard Exceptions Ruling, p.5 (emphasis

Similarly, in the Henroid Exceptions Ruling, Mr. Maak discusses what the

Screening Panel "could have concluded' and "could have chosen not to believe"
Henroid Exceptions Ruling, p.5 (emphasis added). In each case, we are left to guess as to
what evidence the Screening Panel accepted and rejected, and speculate as to whether
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their legal analysis was sound—a practice certainly not contemplated by Rule 14510(b)(7) (requiring the Screening Panel to "state . . . the basis upon which the screening
panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent should be
admonished or publicly reprimanded.") The facts upon which the Panel relied are not
identified, and the basis of their decision is not explained.
Notwithstanding

Mr.

Maak's

efforts

to justify

the

Screening

Panel's

recommendations, the requirements of the Rules of Professional Practice have not been
met. The duty to state the basis of the Screening Panel's recommendation lies with the
Screening Panel at the time the Panel makes its recommendation.

See Rules of

Professional Practice 14-510(b)(7), (9) (formerly 14-510(b)(5)(D), (E)). Any subsequent
attempt by the Chair to connect the dots and justify the conclusions does not cure the
Panel's failure.

Rule 14-510 is designed so that an attorney facing a disciplinary

recommendation may analyze the recommendation and take exception to its findings and
conclusions. Without adequate findings and conclusions, the Rule is deprived of its
effectiveness and the attorney is deprived of due process of law.
Here, the facts and conclusions offered by the Screening Panel do not adequately
apprise Long of the basis of the decision against him. Such a defect materially hinders
Long's ability to take exception to the recommendation, as well as in the current
proceedings. Failure to comply with Article 5 of the Rules of Professional Practice is
grounds for dismissal of a disciplinary action. See Rule of Professional Practice 14510(f)(5)(D). Accordingly, the Screening Panel's recommendation should be disregarded
and the charges should be dismissed.
27
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II.

The Screening Panel's Recommendation Was Not Based Upon Substantial
Evidence:
An attorney is entitled to due process in disciplinary actions. Sonnenreich, 2004

UT 3, Tf 37. An essential characteristic of due process is that decisions be based upon
evidence. See McGrew v. Industrial Comm'n, 85 P.2d 608, 618 (Utah 1938). In a
context similar to this matter, the Utah Supreme Court held that due process requires
"adjudicating the charges based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing." Anderson,
2004 UT 7, f 52 (concerning judicial misconduct).
In reviewing recommendations for discipline by the state bar, the Utah Supreme
Court has stated that factual findings of the bar are sustained only "so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence." Schwenke, 849 P.2d at 576. "Substantial evidence is
something less than the weight of the evidence, but more than a mere scintilla of
evidence," enough that a reasonable mind might consider adequate to support a
conclusion. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 2007 UT 42, f 35, 164 P.3d 384.

In addition, this Court has held that a

"'residuum of legal evidence competent in a court of law'" must support any agency
finding. Beehive Tel Co. v. PSC of Utah, 2004 UT 18, ^ 39, 89 P.3d 131 (quoting Lake
Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 339 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Utah 1959)). In other
words, a finding of fact cannot be based solely on hearsay. Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall,
636 P.2d 481, 486 (Utah 1981).
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In the administrative setting, the Utah Supreme Court had held that an
adjudicatory panel "cannot act on their own information. . . . Their findings must be
based on evidence presented in the case. . . ." Morris v. Public Serv. Comm% 321 P.2d
644, 646 (Utah 1958).

For example, where a finding of intent was necessary for

imposition of a penalty by the state tax commission, the Utah Court of Appeals
disapproved of the commission's findings on the grounds that the commission had merely
made a "mechanical conclusion" regarding the necessary elements of the charge. See
Clements v. Utah State Tax Comm% 893 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The
court remanded, requiring specific findings as to whether the necessary elements of the
charge were met. See id.
In each of the matters at issue, the record lacks sufficient evidence to support the
o

Screening Panel's findings and conclusions.
A.

Shepard Complaint:

In its findings for the Shepard matter, the Screening Panel found as a matter of fact
that "Mr. Long charged an unreasonable fee for services rendered," and concluded as a
matter of law that u[b]y charging Mr. Shepard an unreasonable fee for services rendered,
Mr. Long violated this rule." See Shepard Recommendation, p.2-5. However, the record
does not support either of these statements. Although ample evidence of Long's fees and
8

We recognize our obligation under Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) to "marshal all record
evidence that supports the challenged finding." To that end, we have attempted to set
forth in the statement of facts all relevant facts whether they support or contradict the
Screening Panel's recommendation. Where facts are disputed, we have endeavored to
included both. See, e.g., Fact No. 3. However, please note that the record is devoid of
facts which would support many of the challenged findings. Long cannot marshal
evidence where no evidence exists.
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activities is found in the record, there is no evidence indicating what would constitute an
"excessive" fee or suggesting that Long's fees exceed customary charges in the area for
similar cases or otherwise violate Rule 1.5(a).
The evidence cited by Mr. Maak is insufficient to support the Screening Panel's
recommendation. Not only is such evidence not enough, in light of the remainder of the
record, to be reasonably considered adequate to support a conclusion, Martinez, 2007 UT
42, % 35, but the record lacks evidence concerning several elements of the offenses
charged. For example, no one but Long testified concerning the reasonableness of his
fees and work done on behalf of Shepard. Long explained the basis of his fee and
detailed his work, including time spent with Shepard and work done preparing for
Shepard's case. Shepard R. 000070-73, 000207-213. Similarly, there is no evidence in
the record that would support a finding that the collections claim against Shepard was
without merit. Long has a legitimate claim both in quantum meruit as well based upon
the signed retainer agreement. Shepard R. 000219-20. [cite case] It is not sufficient to
conclude that "[t]he Screening Panel accepted Shepard's version of things." Shepard
Exceptions Ruling, p.3-4. Even accepting all of Shepard's testimony as true, the record
still lacks evidence to sustain each element of the recommended discipline.
The record plainly lacks, and the findings of fact and conclusions of law fail to
refer to, substantial evidence sufficient to support finding violations of Rules in question.
The finding of fact that "Mr. Long charged an unreasonable fee for services rendered" is
a perfect example of a "mechanical conclusion," wholly lacking any specific factual
findings as to the necessary elements of the charged violation. As the Utah Supreme
30
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Court has held, "[c]ommon sense likewise requires a holding that the findings required by
statute be made in accordance with the evidence so presented. If there is no substantial
evidence to support an essential finding, that finding cannot stand and [an] order
predicated upon it must fall." Mountain States Tel & Tel Co. v. Public Serv. Comm 'n,
145 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1944). Accordingly, the Order of Discipline for violating Rules
1.5(a) and 3.1 should be vacated for being unsupported by the evidence in the record.
B.

Nelson Complaint:

In the Nelson matter, the record lacks sufficient evidence to support several of the
Screening Panel's findings and conclusions. The Screening Panel found as a matter of
fact that "Mr. Long failed to effect measures to make reasonably certain that Mr. Scheeler
as his employee complied with the Rules of Professional Conduct" and that "Mr. Long
failed to adequately supervise Joe Scheeler's activities," concluding as a matter of law
that "[b]y failing to effect measures to make reasonably certain that Mr. Long's
employees complied with the Rules of Professional Conduct Mr. Long violated [Rule
5.3(a)]" and "By failing to adequately supervise Mr. Scheeler's activities to insure that
Mr. Scheeler was not engaging in the Unauthorized Practice of Law [sic] and by allowing
Mr. Scheeler to hold himself out as a lawyer, Mr. Long violated [Rule 5.5(a)]." See
Nelson Recommendation, pp.2-4. There is insufficient evidence in the record to support
these findings and conclusions.
No other party testified at the hearing on the Nelson matter. According to Mr.
Maak, the Screening Panel must have inferred from the evidence that Long was not only
aware of his employee's alleged misconduct, but "sought to take advantage of Scheeler's
31
675 -425618V1

improper actions." Nelson Exceptions Ruling, p.5. Such an inference is not only against
the weight of the evidence, but also wholly unexplained by the Screening Panel's
findings and conclusions. Though it is certainly possible that the Screening Panel
followed Mr. Maak's line of reasoning, Mr. Maak, like Long, is only able to venture a
guess as to the Screening Panel's actual analysis.
The record shows Long's efforts to ensure Scheeler's compliance with the rules.
The record also references the written agreement Long had with Scheeler concerning
compliance with the Rules, and specific instructions and discipline Long directed at
Sheeler to ensure his compliance with the Rules. In addition, the Screening Panel's
finding that Long "allowed Mr. Scheeler to appear in court, contact opposing party [sic]
and conduct mediation proceedings at Mr. Long's office" is not only unsupported by any
evidence in the record, but is contrary to testimony of Long at the hearing and the court
docket found in the record. Nelson R. 000046-65; Nelson Transcript, pp.7-8.
C.

Henroid Complaint:

Similarly, the record in the Henroid matter lacks sufficient evidence to support
several of the Screening Panel's findings and conclusions. For example, the Screening
Panel found as a matter of fact that "Mr. Long charged excessive fees for the work he
completed in the Vantreese matter and the Perez Hernandez matter," and concluded as a
matter of law that "[b]y charging excessive fees for work he performed in two cases, Mr.
Long violated Rule 1.5(a) (Fees)." See Henroid Recommendation, pp.2-5. However,
there is no evidence in the record which would support either of these statements.
Indeed, no such evidence was even proffered.
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Long's fees and activities in the three cases before Judge Henroid are welldocumented. See Fact No. 29. There is no evidence indicating what would constitute an
"excessive fee" or suggesting that Long's fees exceed customary charges in the area for
similar cases or otherwise violate Rule 1.5(a).

In fact, no one but Long testified

concerning the reasonableness of the fees of activities of Long. Long explained the basis
of his fees, detailed his work on behalf of each client, and testified that his charges and
methods are typical in the area for similar cases. See Henroid R. 000601, 000676-77.
The evidence in the record indicates each of the fees in question were reasonable, and
Long earned each fee.
In his Ruling on Exceptions, Mr. Maak concludes that "[t]he Screening Panel was
not obligated to believe Long's written retrospective accounting, supported with no
contemporaneous records that were introduced, of services he performed."

Henroid

Exceptions Ruling, p.5. While Long certainly does not argue with this proposition, it
does not justify the Screening Panel's recommendation. The Screening Panel's decision
must be based on the evidence. See Rules of Professional Practice 14-510(b)(7). Where
evidence conflicts, the Screening Panel may believe some, and reject another. However,
the Screening Panel may not reject the only evidence in the record and base its decision
on unsupported speculation.

See Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(b)(7), (9)

(indicating that a screening panel determination must be based upon a preponderance of
the evidence).
Here, Mr. Maak correctly notes that the Screening Panel is not obligated to believe
Long. However, evidence supporting Long's position is the only evidence in the record.
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Judge Henroid's letter is not evidence because it is not verified. See Rule of Professional
Practice 14-510(a)(2) ("The informal complaint shall be notarized and contain a
verification attesting to the accuracy of the information contained in the complaint."),
Moreover, the letter recounts information relayed by Long's clients to Judge Henroid,
which constitutes hearsay within hearsay. No evidence was presented nor testimony
given that Long did not do sufficient work to earn his fee. There is no evidence in the
record that Long charged an unreasonable fee. None of the clients complained of the fee
they were charged. Accordingly, the Order of Discipline for violating Rule 1.5(a) should
be vacated for being unsupported by substantial evidence.
In the Henroid Exceptions Ruling, Mr. Maak offers the unsupported statement that
while the Rules of Professional Practice do assure "due process and a reasonable record
in the event of an Exception," the Rules "do not envision the level of detail and precision
embraced with respect to civil and criminal proceedings." Henroid Exceptions Ruling,
p.7 n.2. Mr. Maak concludes that "such detail and precision would not be practical or
feasible" given that the Screening Panel is comprised of volunteers.
In effect, the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee appears to believe that
although the Committee has the power to take disciplinary action against a lawyer's
license, the fact-finding body upon which the Committee relies cannot be expected to act
with "detail and precision." While the chair may consider detailed findings impractical,
such findings are nevertheless required by the Rules of Professional Practice and this
Court's prior decisions.
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III.

The Screening Panel Misinterpreted the Rules of Professional Conduct
Erroneously Finding Violations of Rules 1.5 (a), 3.1, 53(a), 5.5(a), and 8.4(a):
A.

Rule 1.5(a)

In evaluating the reasonableness of a fee, Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a) enumerates
several factors to be considered. Factors relevant to this case include (1) the novelty and
difficulty of legal issues; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services; (4) results obtained; (5) time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances;
(7) the experience and ability of the lawyer to perform the services; (8) whether the fee is
fixed or contingent. In both the Shepard and Henroid matters, the Screening Panel and
OPC appears to err in defining an unreasonable fee under Rule 1.5(a).
Much of the concern over Long's fees is centered around Long's use of a flat fee
agreement in his criminal practice. A flat fee, or task based billing, is an arrangement
with the client that the lawyer will be paid a specific sum to complete the project. A flat
fee may result in the attorney not receiving the full hourly rate normally charged.
However, there is also the potential to receive compensation greater than a normal hourly
rate. As explained by the Supreme Court of Arizona:
A non-refundable flat fee reflects "a negotiated element of risk sharing
between attorney and client" whereby the "attorney takes the risk that she
will do more work than planned, without additional compensation; and the
client, in return, agrees that the attorney will earn the agreed-upon amount,
even if that amount would exceed the attorney's usual hourly rate. . . ."
Because a non-refundable flat fee reflects a balancing of the risk to both
client and lawyer, a flat fee can be larger than the fee generated by hourly
rates without being excessive.
In re Connelly, 55 P.3d 756, 761-762 (Ariz. 2002) (quoting In the Matter ofSwartz, 686
P.2d 1236,1242-43 (Ariz. 1984)).
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In the case of Stalls v. Pounders, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 42 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2005) the court used the following analysis to determine if a non-refundable fee
agreement was enforceable. The court stated:
This Court has long held that an attorney is entitled to compensation in the
amount agreed upon by contract, provided that the contract is fair at its
inception and entered into in good faith. . . . In order to prove such good
faith and fairness, an attorney seeking to enforce a contract for attorney's
fees must show: (1) the client fully understood the contract's meaning and
effect, (2) the attorney and client shared the same understanding of the
contract, and (3) the terms of the contract are just and reasonable.
Id. at 14-15. The Ethics Advisory Committee of the Utah Supreme Court has likewise
opined that flat fee or fixed fee arrangements do not violate Rule 1.5(a) so long as the fee
is structured to avoid a chilling effect upon the client's right to terminate their lawyer.
See Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 136 (1993). In other words, a portion of the fee
may need to be disgorged if the attorney-client relationship is terminated before
substantial services are performed. See id. Notably, Long's fee agreement provides that
the fee is not earned until substantial services are performed, and tracks the language of
Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 136. See, e.g., Shepard R. 000097 ("No portion of the
flat fee will be refunded once substantial services have been performed, which would
justify attorney retaining the fee.").
1.

Shepard Complaint:

Rule 1.5(a) prohibits making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an
unreasonable fee. In the Screening Panel Memo, OPC offers an incorrect standard for
determining whether Long's fee is unreasonable. To the extent this standard was adopted
by the Screening Panel, any discipline predicated thereon would be improper.
36
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The Screening Panel Memo attempted to use Long's fee agreement to define
whether the fee was proper.

The Shepard Screening Panel Memo recommended

discipline upon a finding that Long "did not earn the $6,600 fee since Mr. Shepard did
not pay the amount and under Mr. Long's Fee Agreement the fee is earned when payment
is received." Shepard Screening Panel Memo, pp.5-6. Such a standard is not founded in
the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The retainer agreement between Long and Shepard merely dictates the payment
expectation and terms between the parties, not the applicable Rules of Professional
Conduct. Long did not violate Rule 1.5(a) because he did not make an agreement for,
charge, or collect an unreasonable fee. Shepard approached Long seeking help with a
felony DUI. Considering Shepard's prior convictions and the factual circumstances of
the case, the legal matter was rather complicated. Shepard was potentially at risk of up to
5 years. Imprisonment and a substantial fine. Additional factors properly considered and
found in the record are that Shepard approached Long the night before he would need
representation at a hearing, and Long has approximately 40 years of experience dealing
with such matters. Long also presented evidence that $6,600 is within the range of fees
customarily charged in Utah for this type of case.

These factors, all appropriately

considered under Rule 1.5(a), indicate that the fee agreed upon would have been
reasonable had Long represented Shepard for the duration of the matter as contemplated
by the parties when the fee agreement was signed.
Similarly, the fee charged was reasonable. The fee agreement signed by Shepard
indicated that the terms of representation provided for a flat fee. The fee would be
37
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earned, in full, upon performance of any substantial work.

Shepard signed the fee

agreement—initialing each paragraph—after Long reviewed its provisions and details
following the hearing. Shepard R. 000097-99, 000209-10. The record shows that Long
performed substantial work for Shepard. It was reasonable for Long to conclude, based
on the fee agreement, that he was justified in charging the agreed-upon fee.
Lastly, the fee collected was reasonable.

Long did an after-hours initial

consultation with Shepard, prepared and faxed a document due by midnight that day,
prepared that same evening for a hearing the following morning, accompanied Shepard at
8:00 a.m. the following morning to Pretrial Services, appeared on behalf of Shepard at a
hearing shortly thereafter, and attained a positive result for Shepard at the hearing. See
Fact No. 2, 6. The actual fee collected by Long was only $100. Considering the 6 hours
of work Long testified he completed in Shepard's case, this was not an unreasonable fee.
As noted above, nothing in the record supports a conclusion that the fee agreed
upon or collected in the Shepard matter was unreasonable. In contrast, Long testified and
presented evidence regarding the nature and extent of his services and the basis of his fee.
This uncontroverted evidence requires that the Screening Panel's recommendation of
discipline be disregarded, and the charges against Long dismissed.
2.

Henroid Complaint:

In the Henroid matter, the Screening Panel again adopted an incorrect standard for
Rule 1.5(a) offered by OPC in its Screening Panel Memo. OPC suggested, and the
Screening Panel found, that Long charged "excessive" fees. See Henroid Screening
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Panel Memo, p. 12; Henroid Recommendation, p.2. Rule 1.5(a) does not attempt to
define whether a fee is "excessive," only whether it is "reasonable."
The Screening Panel concluded that Long's fee was "excessive," as opposed to the
correct standard of unreasonable, in the Vantreese and Perez-Hernandez matters. As
noted above, there is no evidence or testimony in the record to that effect.

In fact,

nothing in the record supports a conclusion that the fees charged in the Vantreese and
Perez-Hernandez matters were unreasonable, save the initial letter from Judge Henroid
complaining of Long's fees, which is not evidence in this matter and is hearsay within
hearsay.

Similarly, OPC's statement in the Notice of Informal Complaint that "the

docket reflects that you performed minimal work" reflects an incomplete assessment of
the facts and improper legal standard for Rule 1.5(a). Obviously not all work performed
by an attorney is recorded in a court's docket. It would be incorrect to conclude that only
docketed acts are considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee.
In contrast, Long testified and presented evidence regarding the nature and extent
of his services and the basis of his fee. OPC failed to even proffer evidence to dispute
Long's contentions. This uncontroverted evidence requires a finding that Long did not
charge an unreasonable fee to any client in the Henroid matter.
B.

Rule 3.1

Rule 3.1 prohibits a lawyer from bringing a claim unless there is a basis in law and
fact for doing so that is not frivolous. The rule requires only that a lawyer be able to
make a good faith argument in support of their position. See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 3.1,
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comment 2. In the present case, the Screening Panel made an erroneous finding of fact in
concluding that the collection claim against Shepard was frivolous.
The fee agreement between Long and Shepard indicated that the fee agreed upon
by the parties was considered earned once Long performed substantial legal services for
the client. See Shepard R. 000097. As explained above, Long performed substantial
services for Shepard when he completed approximately 6 hours of legal work for
Shepard, consulted with him after hours, drafted and faxed a request to the court which
was due my midnight the day Long was engaged, represented Shepard before Pretrial
Services and at a hearing, and prepared for a subsequent hearing. See Fact No. 2, 6-7.
After Long represented Shepard at the hearing the next morning, Shepard signed the Fee
Agreement and initialed each paragraph as it was explained to him. Shepard R. 000209.
Although Shepard ultimately decided to retain another attorney, Long had a reasonable
contractual expectation that he would receive the flat fee agreed upon, and was within his
rights to seek that fee.
Other courts considering this issue have held that an attorney would be justified in
attempting to enforce a flat fee agreement. As noted above, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals held that an attorney is entitled to enforce a fee agreement so long as the
agreement is "fair at its inception and entered into in good faith." Stalls9 2005 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 42, 14-15. Taking a different approach, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held
that even where a flat fee contract may be unenforceable in full, an attorney may recover
damages in quanum meruit or contractual damages if, in entering into such a contract, the
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attorney changed positions or incurred expenses. McQueen, Rains & Tresch, LLP v.
Citgo Petroleum Corp., 195 P. 3d 35, 44 (Okla. 2008).
At the Screening Panel Hearing, Long argued both a contractual basis for
enforcing the contract, and a claim in quantum meruit. The record shows that Long
performed substantial services on Shepard's behalf. Shepard knowingly and intentionally
signed the retainer agreement after Long commenced the representation and reviewed
each paragraph with Shepard. It is simple error to conclude from this evidence that Long
did not have a good faith claim to compensation either under the contract or in quantum
meruit, and there is no evidence that Long was attempting to use the collection action to
extract an unreasonable fee or limit the client's ability to terminate representation.9
Because Long could make a good faith argument that he was entitled to the fee sought,
no action to collect that fee could be considered in violation of Rule 3.1.
C.

Rule 5.3(a)

Rule 5.3(a) requires a supervising lawyer to "make reasonable efforts to ensure
that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct
is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer." Comment 1 states that a
lawyer must give assistants "appropriate instruction and supervision."
In the Nelson Screening Panel Memo, OPC once again suggests an incorrect legal
standard with respect to Rule 5.3(a). OPC directs that Long should be found to have
9

In fact, the undisputed evidence shows that as soon as Long became aware of the
collection lawsuit, he directed that the claim should be dropped. This stands in stark
contrast to Fla. Bar v. Richardson, 547 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1990), where a lawyer was found
to have violated Rule 3.1 after "obsessive" attempts to vacate a court order requiring him
to refund an excessive fee.
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violated the rule if Long's non-lawyer employee drafted a document that only a lawyer
may draft under Rule 2.4(c) or Long's non-lawyer employee contacted an opposing party
represented by counsel. See Nelson Screening Panel Memo, pp.9-10. As noted above,
Rule 5.3(a) only requires "reasonable efforts" to give "reasonable assurance" that an
assistant's conduct will comply with the Rules. A finding that a non-lawyer employee
violated a Rule does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Rule 5.3(a) was violated.
The Arizona Supreme Court in In re Galbasini, 786 P.2d 971, 975 (Ariz. 1990), stated
well:
An attorney who supervises a nonlawyer associate is not required to
guarantee that the associate will never engage in "incompatible" conduct,
for that would be tantamount to vicarious liability. . . . Circumstances will
dictate what constitutes a "reasonable effort" to instill in nonlawyer
personnel an appropriate respect for their duties. Certainly new personnel
must be carefully screened and given at least some instruction in the
fundamentals of professional responsibility.
Id. (quoting G. Hazard, Jr., & W. Hodes, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,

p. 464 (1989)).

OPC misconstrued Rule 5.3(a) by implying that Long is strictly liable for acts of a
non-lawyer assistant which violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. Even if Scheeler
improperly drafted documents or held himself out to be a lawyer, such conduct would not
automatically mean that Long violated Rule 5.3(a). To the extent that the Screening
Panel adopted OPC's flawed reasoning, the Panel's recommendation is improper.
Other jurisdictions have held with respect to Rule 5.3 that "[although there may
often be some question of what is a reasonable effort to ensure proper conduct by
nonlawyer employees, at a minimum the lawyer must screen, instruct, and supervise. " In
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re Struthers, 877 P.2d 789 (Ariz. 1994). The Screening Panel correctly stated that Long
could be found to have violated Rule 5.3(a) if he failed to have in effect measures to
make "reasonably certain" that his employee's conduct complied with the Rules of
Professional Conduct. However, the Screening Panel made no findings of fact, other than
the unsupported and conclusory statement in \ 10 of its findings of fact, that Long failed
to design and implement such measures. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record
that suggests Long failed to adequately have in place measures designed to prevent
unethical conduct by non-lawyer assistants.

To the contrary, Long had a written

agreement with Scheeler requiring his strict compliance with the Rules.

Nelson

Transcript, p.7. See also People v. Smith, 74 P.3d 566, 571 (Colo. 2003) ("The evidence
presented, however, revealed that Smith did have measures in place to reasonably assure
that . . . Ross would conduct herself in such a manner as was compatible with his
professional responsibilities. Ross didn't follow those measures. Since such measures
were in place, the charged violation of Colo. RPC 5.3(a) is dismissed.").
In the Nelson Exceptions Ruling, Mr. Maak makes the argument that Scheeler's
conduct, some of which may have violated the Rules, implies that Long's effort to control
Scheeler were not reasonable.

Rule 5.3(a) requires that a managerial lawyer make

"reasonable efforts" to ensure ethical conduct, not that the lawyer's efforts be
impenetrable. Evidence in the record shows that Long took action even before Scheeler
was hired to ensure his compliance with the Rules of Professional conduct. Ultimately,
Long and Scheeler's employment relationship was terminated in part due to noncompliance with that agreement and the Rules of Professional Conduct. It is simply
43
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contrary to the evidence in the record to conclude that Long failed to make reasonable
efforts to ensure the ethical conduct of his employees.
D.

Rule 5.5(a)

Rule 5.5(a) directs that a lawyer may not engage in, or assist another in engaging
in, the unauthorized practice of law. Rule 14-802(b) of the Rules Professional Practice
defines the "practice of law" as "the representation of the interests of another person by
informing, counseling, advising, assisting, advocating for or drafting documents for that
person through application of the law and associated legal principles to that person's facts
and circumstances."

The rule specifically excludes from the practice of law

"[representing a party in any mediation proceeding" and "[sjerving in a neutral capacity
as a mediator, arbitrator or conciliator." Rule of Professional Practice 14-802(c)(7), (9).
In the Screening Panel Memo, OPC suggests that Long violated Rule 5.5(a) if he
assisted Scheeler in attempting to practice law "by drafting documents that only lawyer
mediators may draft." Nelson Screening Panel Memo, p. 11. Once again, OPC offers a
legal standard that misinterprets the Rules of Professional Conduct. To the extent that
standard was adopted by the Screening Panel, any recommendation of discipline is
improper.
The Screening Panel appears to conclude that only a lawyer may draft a document
that formally memorializes an agreement reached in mediation. In fact, Rule 2.4(c)
merely states that a lawyer-mediator may draft such a document.

It does not state

anywhere that only a lawyer may draft such a document. Rule of Professional Practice
14-802(c)(7) and (9) specifically allow a non-lawyer to represent a party in a mediation
44
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and serve as a mediator. Likewise, a non-lawyer may draft documents under the
supervision of a lawyer.
There is no evidence in the record that Long allowed or assisted Scheeler in
holding himself out as a lawyer or engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. Long
testified that on multiple occasions he specifically prohibited Scheeler from holding
himself out as or acting like a lawyer. Nelson Transcript, pp.7-8, 10. The complainant in
this case, Gordon Nelson, stated in his hand-written complaint: "Larry told my wife &
David that Joe [Scheeler] did not have a license to practice law in any way." See Nelson
Record 0001. In addition, there is no evidence in the record and no notation in any
docket for any hearing that Scheeler entered an appearance on behalf of Merritt, as the
Screening Panel claims in Tf 12 of its findings of fact. The record lacks, and the
Screening Panel failed to cite, any evidence which would explain it's conclusion that
Long violated Rule 5.5(a). In arriving at its recommendation, the Screening Panel
appears to have mistaken the range of tasks which may be performed by a non-lawyer.
E.

Rule 8.4(a)

Rule 8.4(a) provides that "a lawyer may not violate or attempt to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through
the acts of another." Because Long did not violate Rules 1.5(a), 3.1, 5.3(a), or 5.5(a), it is
not necessary to invoke the disciplinary function of Rule 8.4(a). Accordingly, the charge
that Long violated Rule 8.4(a) should be dismissed.
IV.

The Recommended Discipline for Violating Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) Should Be
Reduced:
45

In both the Shepard and Henroid matters, the Screening Panel recommended
finding violations of Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) on the grounds that Long misrepresented his
status as a solo practitioner by referring to his firm as Long & Associates or L. Long
Lawyers. Long concedes that at all times relevant, he was the only lawyer employed by
the firm L. Long Lawyer, Inc. As Long testified in the hearing for the Henroid matter,
the firm has employed associate lawyers in the past. Long has endeavored to represent
himself as L. Long Lawyer, Inc. (as opposed to L. Long Lawyers, Inc.) when he has been
the only attorney employed by the firm, but has admittedly been inconsistent in doing so.
Henroid R. 000609. In the factual record for each of the cases at issue, documents can be
found using both the singular and plural name of the firm. Compare Henroid R. 000085
with 000526.
The violation of Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) has been the result of Long's negligence, not
any purposeful attempt to deceive or mislead clients. Testimony at the hearing affirms
that it was never suggested to clients that multiple attorneys work at the firm, or that
anyone other than Long was their lawyer. As noted by Rule 14-607(b)(2) of the Rules of
Professional Practice, absence of a dishonest or selfish motive should be considered in
determining appropriate discipline for a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law for each matter do not indicate if
appropriate consideration was taken.
V.

The Screening Panel's Disciplinary Recommendations Are Improper and
Inconsistent:
A.

The Appropriate Sanction Under the Circumstances Is an Admonition.
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In the Shepard matter, Long received an Admonition for violations of Rules
1.5(a), 3.1, 7.1, 7.5(d), and 8.4(a).

In the Nelson matter, Long received a Public

Reprimand for violations of Rules 5.3(a), 5.5(a), and 8.4(a). In the Henroid matter, Long
received a Public Reprimand for violations of Rules 1.5(a), 7.1, 7.5(d), and 8.4(a).
According to Rule 14-605 of the Rules of Professional Practice:
(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
and causes injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or
causes interference with a legal proceeding; or
(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the
lawyer's fitness to practice law.
(d) Admonition. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(d)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
and causes little or no injury to a party, the public, or the legal
system or interference with a legal proceeding, but exposes a
party, the public, or the legal system to potential injury or causes
potential interference with a legal proceeding;
Rules of Professional Practice 14-605 (emphasis added). In each of the matters at issue,
there is no evidence in the record that any party was injured by any alleged violation or
that any of the charged conduct involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
Thus, under the guidelines in Rule of Professional Practice 14-605, only an admonition
would be appropriate discipline absent aggravating circumstances.

No aggravating

circumstances are mentioned in any of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendation of Discipline in each of the matters at issue.
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c-7C . / n c f i i f l w i

B.

The Sanctions Imposed Are Inconsistent.

An aggregate examination of the cases against Long reveals issues with
consistency in the administration of attorney discipline.

The Rules of Professional

Practice specifically state that the Rules are designed to promote "consistency in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar offenses within and among
jurisdictions." Rules of Professional Practice 14-602(d)(3) (emphasis added). Despite
contemporaneous review of four10 factually similar cases, the Screening Panel arrived at
inconsistent, and often illogical, resolution of each case.
For example, three of the four cases against Long included allegations that Long
violated Rule 1.5(a). Disposing of the three cases, the Screening Panel recommended—
without any explanation or substantially different findings of fact or conclusions of law—
a dismissal, an admonition, and a public reprimand. Case 07-0542, with the largest
allegedly improper fee ($31,000), was dismissed on condition. The Henroid matter, with
much smaller allegedly improper fees ($8,900 and $10,000), resulted in a public
reprimand. Finally, the Shepard Matter ($6,600) resulted in an admonition.
Similarly, in three of the four cases against Long, the Screening Panel considered
allegations that Long was using an improper and misleading firm name, violating Rules
7.1 and 7.5(d). In the Shepard matter, Long was admonished concerning these violations.
In the Henroid matter, the Screening Panel recommended a public reprimand. In the
Nelson matter, OPC recommended further investigation of the firm name issue in its

10

OPC File No. 07-0542 was dismissed on condition and is not challenged in this
Petition.
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Screening Panel Memo, but the Screening Panel apparently found insufficient evidence to
warrant any discipline on this charge, and no violation was recommended.
As argued in Part I of this brief, it is difficult for Long to defend against the
Screening Panel's unexplained recommendations without any knowledge of the facts
relied upon and reasoning employed. In an attempt to dismiss the inconsistency of the
Screening Panel's recommendation in the Henroid matter, Mr. Maak sustains Long's
complaint regarding inadequate findings and conclusions.

Mr. Maak defends the

Screening Panel's recommendation stating that to do otherwise, "one must assume that
the Panel accepted Long's version of the work he performed on each of these matters, a
fact that does not appear in the record and which is inconsistent with the Panel's
findings."

Henroid Exceptions Ruling, p.7 (emphasis added).

As Mr. Maak

acknowledges, the record and findings of the Screening Panel do not explain the
apparently inconsistent result in the Henroid recommendation. One is left to guess at the
factual basis and reasoning of the Screening Panel—a practice certainly not contemplated
by Rule 14-510(b)(7) (requiring the Screening Panel to "state . . . the basis upon which
the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
respondent should be admonished or publicly reprimanded.").
The Screening Panel neglected to adhere to the Court's instruction that a lawyer be
given the opportunity to know the basis of the recommendation against him. See Rules of
Professional Practice 14-510(c).

The Panel likewise failed to promote consistent

disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar offenses. See Rules of Professional Practice
14-602(d)(3).
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CONCLUSION
In each of the three matters below, the rules promulgated by this Court regarding
attorney disciplinary proceedings were not followed.

As a result, an attorney was

incorrectly subject to disciplinary action and denied due process of law. Based on the
foregoing, each Order of Discipline should be vacated. Long should be admonished or
issued a letter of caution regarding his inadvertent violations of Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d), and
the Committee should be ordered to print a retraction in the Utah Bar Journal regarding
sanctions imposed against Long.
DATED this _23_ day of April, 2010.

VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

^2U
John A. Snow
AlexB.Leeman
Attorneys for Petitioner Larry N. Long
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LARRY N.LONG,
Appellate Case No. 20091018-SC
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vs.
ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE
COMMITTEE OF THE UTAH SUPREME
COURT,
Respondent.

ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF PETITIONER

On Petition for Review or Petition for Extraordinary Relief
from a final Order of Discipline: Admonition, Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand,
and Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand
by Respondent Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court,
OPC File Nos. 07-0497, 08-0049, and 08-0080.

OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
UTAH STATE BAR

Billy L. Walker (#3358)
Adam C. Bevis (#9889)
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Tel: 801-531-9110
Email: adam.bevis@utahbar.org
Attorneys for the Ethics and Discipline
Committee of the Utah State Bar

VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

John A. Snow (#3025)
Alex B. Leeman (#12578)
36 South State Street, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Tel: 801-532-3333
Fax: 801-534-0058
Email: jsnow@vancott.com,
aleeman@vancott.com
Attorneys for Petitioner Larry N. Long

1

Petitioner Larry N. Long, by and through counsel, submits this Addendum to Brief
of Petitioner. The following documents are submitted herewith:
1.

Exhibit A: Determinative Law

2.

Exhibit B: OPC Matter No. 07-0497 (Shepard) Order of Discipline:
Admonition

3.

Exhibit C: OPC Matter No. 07-0497 (Shepard) Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Admonition

4.

Exhibit D: OPC Matter No. 07-0497 (Shepard) Ruling on Exception to
Screening Panel Recommendation of Discipline.

5.

Exhibit E: OPC Matter No. 08-0049 (Nelson) Order of Discipline:
Public Reprimand

6.

Exhibit F:
OPC Matter 08-0049 (Nelson) Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Public
Reprimand

7.

Exhibit G: OPC Matter 08-0049 (Nelson) Ruling on Exception to
Screening Panel Recommendation of Discipline.

8.

Exhibit H: OPC Matter No. 08-0080 (Henroid) Order of Discipline:
Public Reprimand

9.

Exhibit I: OPC Matter No. 08-0080 (Henroid) Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Public
Reprimand

10.

Exhibit J: OPC Matter No. 08-0080 (Henroid) Ruling on Exception to
Screening Panel Recommendation of Discipline.

DATED this jZ_*_ day of April, 2010.
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

&*?
John A. Snow
Alex B. Leeman
Attorneys for Petitioner Larry N. Long
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EXHIBIT A

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Rule of Professional Practice U-SlOibXl):1
(b)(7) Recommendation of admonition or public reprimand. A screening
panel recommendation that the respondent should be disciplined under
subsection (b)(6)(C) or (b)(6)(D) shall be in writing and shall state the
substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses and the basis
upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the respondent should be admonished or publicly

1

Prior to November 1, 2009, the proposition cited was numbered Rule of Professional
Practice 14-510(b)(5), and read as follows:
(b)(5) Screening panel determination. Upon review of all the facts
developed by the informal complaint, answer, investigation and hearing, the
screening panel, in behalf of the Committee, shall make one of the
following determinations:
(b)(5)(D) that the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair
with an accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent
be admonished. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in writing
and shall state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and
defenses and the basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent should be admonished.
A copy of such screening panel recommendation shall be served upon the
respondent prior to delivery of the recommendation to the Committee chair.
The Committee chair shall enter an order admonishing the respondent if no
exception has been filed within ten days of notice of the recommendation
being provided to the respondent; or
(b)(5)(E) that the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair
with an accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent
receive a public reprimand. Such screening panel recommendation shall be
in writing and shall state the substance and nature of the informal complaint
and defenses and the basis upon which the screening panel has concluded,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent should receive a
public reprimand. A copy of such screening panel recommendation shall
be served upon the respondent prior to delivery of the recommendation to
the Committee chair. The Committee chair shall enter an order publically
reprimanding the respondent if no exception has been filed within ten days
of notice of the recommendation being provided to the respondent^]
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reprimanded. A copy of such screening panel recommendation shall be
delivered to the Committee chair and a copy served upon the respondent.
Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(f)(5):
(f)(5) Respondent shall have the burden of demonstrating that the
Committee action was:
(f)(5)(A) Based on a determination of fact that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before
the Court;
(f)(5)(B) An abuse of discretion;
(f)(5)(C) Arbitrary or capricious; or
(f)(5)(D) Contrary to Articles 5 and 6 of Chapter 14 of the Rules of
Professional Practice of the Supreme Court.
Rule of Professional Practice 14-602(d):
(d) Purpose of these rules. These rules are designed for use in imposing a
sanction or sanctions following a determination that a member of the legal
profession has violated a provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Descriptions in these rules of substantive disciplinary offenses are not
intended to create grounds for determining culpability independent of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. The rules constitute a system for
determining sanctions, permitting flexibility and creativity in assigning
sanctions in particular cases of lawyer misconduct. They are designed to
promote:
(d)(1) consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the
appropriate level of sanction in an individual case;
(d)(2) consideration of the appropriate weight of such factors in light
of the stated goals of lawyer discipline; and
(d)(3) consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the
same or similar offenses within and among jurisdictions.
Rule of Professional Practice 14-605(d):
(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and
causes injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes
interference with a legal proceeding; or
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(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the
lawyer's fitness to practice law.
(d) Admonition. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(d)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and
causes little or no injury to a party, the public, or the legal system
or interference with a legal proceeding, but exposes a party, the
public, or the legal system to potential injury or causes potential
interference with a legal proceeding^]
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a):
(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge or collect an
unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to
be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the
following:
(a)(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(a)(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude other employment by the
lawyer;
(a)(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services;
(a)(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(a)(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances;
(a)(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;
(a)(7) the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(a)(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an
issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good-faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a
criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in
3
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incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that
every element of the case be established.
Rule of Professional Conduct 5.3(a):
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a
lawyer:
(a) a partner and a lawyer who individually or together with other
lawyers possess comparable managerial authority in a law firm shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect
measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer[.]
Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5(a):
(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violatiou of the
regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in
doing so.
Rule of Professional Conduct 7.1:
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the
lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if
it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact
necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially
misleading.
Rule of Professional Conduct 7.5(d):
(d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other
organization only when that is the fact.
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a):
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the
acts of another[.]

4
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EXHIBIT B

BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

:
:

Larry N. Long #01989

:

ORDER OF DISCIPLINE:
ADMONITION

Case No. 07-0497
Respondent.

:

This matter came on for a hearing on February 19, 2009, before Screening
Panel "C-2" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court. The
Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee, having reviewed the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and the Recommendation of Discipline of the Screening Panel,
and being fully advised in the premises, hereby orders that Larry N. Long be and is
hereby, admonished for violating Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and
Contentions) Rule 7.1 (Communications concerning a Lawyer's Services), Rule 7.5(d)
(Firm Names and Letterheads) and 8.4(a) (Misconduct).

DATED this the 1 3

day of Kicx/ETK^frETt-

JmhupB. Dcrger, Chair
Ethics and Discipline Committee

200?

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the W

day of ibi/ewV.-, 200^1 sent via United States

first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF
DISCIPLINE: ADMONITION to:
Larry N. Long
c/o John A. Snow
36 S. State Street, Ste. 1900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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EXHIBIT C

BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF DISCIPLINE: ADMONITION

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:
Larry N. Long, #01989

Case No. 07-0497
Respondent.

The matter of the complaint by Steven Shepard against Larry N. Long came on
for hearing before Screening Pane! "C-2" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the
Utah Supreme Court on February 19, 2009. Mr. Long appeared in person with Charles
Gruber as Counsel; Mr. Shepard appeared by phone; and Barbara L. Townsend,
Assistant Counsel, appeared on behalf of the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional
Conduct ("OPC").
The Screening Panel recommends that Mr. Long be admonished for violation of
Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), Rule 7.1
(Communications concerning a Lawyer's Services), Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and
Letterheads) and 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The facts
upon which the Screening Panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that Mr. Long should be admonished are as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Mr. Shepard met with Mr. Long for a free consultation.

2.

Mr. Long discussed his fees with Mr. Shepard and told him that his fee

would be $6,600.00, if Mr. Shepard chose to hire him.
3.

Mr. Long appeared at one court hearing on an emergency basis.

4.

Mr. Long met with Mr. Shepard afterwards and discussed his fee. Mr.

Shephard paid $100.00 for the appearance.
5.

Mr. Shepard signed a retainer agreement but then decided and told Mr.

Long he did not want his representation.
6.

Mr. Shepard hired another attorney whose fee was less.

7.

Even though he had not been retained, Mr. Long appeared at a driver's

license hearing. Mr. Long left when he saw that Mr. Shepard had another attorney.
8.

Mr. Long filed a collection lawsuit against Mr. Shepard for $7,775.34.

9.

Mr. Long charged an unreasonable fee for services rendered.

10.

Mr. Long caused a debt collection to be file for an amount more than what

was owed.
11.

Mr. Long used L. Long Lawyers and Long and Associates as firm names

on his letterhead when he is the only attorney in his office.
12.

L. Long Lawyers and Long and Associates represent to the public that

there are other lawyers at Mr. Long's office.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
2

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Rule 1.5(a) (Fees))
1.

Rule 15(a). Fees. This rule states: "A lawyer shall not make an

agreement for, charge or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for
expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee
include the following 1) the lime and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 2) the
likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer; 3) the fee customarily charged in the locality
for similar legal services; 4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 5) the time
limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 6) the nature and length of
the professional relationship with the client; 7) the experience, reputation and ability of
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and 8) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent." Mr. Long's fee of $6,600 was unreasonable given that Mr. Shepard paid
him for one hearing and then decided not to hire him. By charging Mr. Shepard an
unreasonable fee for services rendered, Mr. Long violated this rule.
(Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims ancl Contentions))
2.

Rule 3.1. Meritorious Claims and Contentions. This rule states: "A lawyer

shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless
there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a goodfaith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the
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defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result
in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every
element of the case be established." Mr. Long sued Mr. Shepard for $7,775.34 when he
knew that he had not earned this fee and by filing a debt collection case for an amount
more than owed to him, Mr. Long violated this rule.
(Rule 7.1 (Communications concerning a Lawyer's Services))
3.

Rule 7.1. Communications concerning a Lawyer's Services. This rule

states: "A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer
or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material
misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement
considered as a whole not materially misleading". By using firm names of Long Lawyers
and Long & Associates, Mr. Long misled the general public into believing that more
than one lawyer worked at his office when in fact there was only one lawyer. By doing
this , Mr. Long violated this rule.
(Rule 7.5(d) (T mil Names and Letterheads))
4.

Rule 7.5(d). Firm Names and Letterheads. This rule states: "Lawyers may

state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is
the fact. Mr. Long violated this rule by stating that he practiced in a firm of lawyers
when he did not.
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(Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct))
5.

Rule 8.4(a). This rule states: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to

violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or
induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another." By violating the above
described rules, Mr. Long violated this rule.

MITIGATING FACTORS
The Panel considered the following aggravating circumstances pursuant to Rule
14-607 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions:
1.

Mr. Long did not actually collect the amount $7,775 from his client but

resolved the dispute with this client without charging additional fees for the work he had
performed.
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE
Based upon the foregoing, the Screening Panel recommends that Larry N. Long
be admonished for violation of Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and
Contentions), Rule 7.1 (Communications concerning a Lawyer's Services), Rule 7.5(d)
(Firm Names and Letterheads) and 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.
DATED this

/*[

day of

'vyjHiL

200 J
~^

latt Evans, Chair
Screening Panel "C-2"

s

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 1 7

day of NoVCiAA rPC

, 200 J I sent via

United States first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION FOR
DISCIPLINE: ADMONITION to:

Larry N. Long
c/o John A. Snow
36 S. State Street, Ste. 1900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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EXHIBIT D

BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of the Complaint of:
Steven Shepard,
Complainant,

RULING ON EXCEPTION TO
SCREENING PANEL
RECOMMENDATION OF
DISCIPLINE

Against
Larry N. Long,

OPC File No. 07-0497

Respondent.

This matter is before the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 14-510(c) of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
on Respondent's Exception to a Screening Panel recommendation that Respondent receive an
admonition.
STANDARD FOR DECIDING RESPONDENTS EXCEPTION
As to Exceptions, Rule 14-510(c) of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
states that "[t]he respondent shall have the burden of proof of showing that the recommendation
is unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious and otherwise clearly
erroneous."
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
The Screening Panel Proceeding. The Screening Panel hearing occurred on February
19, 2009 before Screening Panel C-2. The Screening Panel determined that Mr. Long violated
Rule 1.5(a) through charging an unreasonable fee for services rendered and that he violated Rule

3.1 by causing to be filed a debt collection action for amounts in excess than those that were
owed to him. The Panel also found that Mr. Long violated Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) by placing on his
letterhead "L. Long Lawyer" or "Long & Associates/' which led the public to believe that more
than one lawyer was affiliated with the firm when in fact there was only one lawyer — Mr. Long.
The Panel recommended that the Respondent be admonished for these violations.
The Exception. OPC supplied Mr. Long with proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and a Recommendation of Discipline and a proposed Order of Discipline by letter dated
June 15, 2009. Long, through Charles A. Gruber as his counsel, filed an Exception on July 1,
2009. Thereafter, Mr. Gruber indicated his intention to call the Complainant at the Exception
Hearing and to cross-examine him. Mr. Gruber withdrew as Mr. Long's counsel by Notice of
Withdrawal dated September 22,2009. John A. Snow of the Van Cott firm entered his
appearance as counsel for Mr. Long and (i) withdrew Mr. Gruber's request to cross-examine the
Complainant, indicated that Mr. Long would not rely upon the documents Mr. Gruber filed with
respect to the Exception (other than procedurally to perfect the Exception), and on October 22,
2009 filed Exceptions to Screening Panel's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendation.
The Exception Hearing. The hearing of the Exception occurred on October 28, 2009
between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. Present at the hearing were the undersigned Chair, Barbara L.
Townsend, Assistant Counsel to OPC, Respondent Larry N. Long, John A. Snow, and Alex B.
Leeman. Complainant was not present at the hearing. Respondent offered argument concerning
the Exception and OPC counsel also made statements during the Exception hearing.
ANALYSIS OF EXCEPTION
The Screening Panel decision sheet and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
-2-

Recommendation of Discipline find violations of the following Rules of Professional Conduct
based upon the following general behaviors:
(1)

Rule 1.5(a) based upon making an agreement for, charging, or collecting

an unreasonable fee.
(2)

Rule 3.1 based upon the bringing of a debt collection action for amounts in

excess of those that were due for services.
(3)

Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) by communicating, issuing a communication, or

using a firm name or letterhead implying that Mr. Long's firm employed more than one
attorney when it did not.
Each of the foregoing three items will be addressed separately.
1.

Unreasonable Fee. The Screening Panel found that Mr. Long charged an

unreasonable fee. The Exception briefing and argument assert that there was not substantial
evidence in the record to justify the finding that Long charged an unreasonable fee, that the only
testimony concerning that issue was Long's testimony that the fees in question were reasonable,
and that the Screening Panel's Findings of Fact failed adequately to articulate the facts upon
which the Panel based its decision. The evidence before the Screening Panel included evidence
that Long and Shepard agreed to Shepard's payment of $100.00 to compensate Long for an initial
consultation and attending the first hearing. The flat fee agreement for legal services between
Shepard and Long dated October 24, 2006 provided for a fee of $6,600.00 for Long's
representation of Shepard up to and including the pretrial conference or preliminary hearing and
subsequent sentencing upon entry of a plea. The record contains evidence that within two days
after signing the fee agreement (and before Long had performed services beyond those for which
he was compensated by the $100.00), Shepard advised Long that he had hired another attorney
-3-

and did not wish to proceed with Mr. Long as his counsel. Thereafter, a collection service,
Express Recovery Services, Inc., initiated an action against Shepard on or about April 16, 2007
(long after Shepard testified that he informed Long that he did not wish to utilize his services) to
recover the full amount of $6,600.00 under the fee agreement plus interest and attorney's fees.
Long's counsel at the Screening Pane! hearing indicated that Long rendered services valued at
only $1,500.00. Shepard indicated that his total contact with Long regarding the case lasted
approximately 45 minutes. Ultimately, Long caused the collection service's lawsuit against
Shepard to be dismissed with Shepard paying nothing.
The Screening Panel accepted Shepard's version of things, and Long has not earned his
burden on this point to show that this recommendation was unreasonable, unsupported by
substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise clearly erroneous.1
2.

Pursuing Unmeritorious Claim. The Panel found that Long violated Rule 3.1

by causing to be filed a debt collection action for amounts in excess of those to which he had an
entitlement. Long argues that because the fee agreement prescribed that the fee agreed upon by
the parties is considered earned once Long performed substantial legal services, and because it
provided that no portion of the fee was refundable once substantial services had been performed,
Long earned the $6,600.00 and causing a debt collection firm to pursue the entire matter was not,
therefore, the pursuit of a frivolous claim. First, as indicated under the preceding section, there
was evidence in the record that Long was fully compensated for the services he performed

'Although the Findings of Fact do not enumerate the facts upon which the Panel's
decision was based in evidentiary detail, they do make the requisite finding, albeit in somewhat
conclusory form, that Long charged an unreasonable fee. Since the transaction with respect to
which the fee was charged and the fee in question are self-evident (as there was only one
engagement), the Panel's Findings were sufficient to support its conclusions.
-4-

through a payment of $100.00 and that he performed no services thereafter pursuant to the fee
agreement. Concededly, fixed-price fee agreements are permissible under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, but any fee that is charged must still fulfill the requirements of Rule
1.5(a), which requires that the fee be reasonable in light of the factors set forth there. Here, upon
evidence that the Panel believed or could have believed, Mr. Long did not render any services
beyond those for which he was compensated through the initial $100.00 payment. There was,
therefore, substantial evidence that Long's charging $6,600.00 (plus interest and attorney's fees)
was charging or attempting to collect an unreasonable fee. Long next argues that Long, himself,
did not file the collection action against Shepard, but rather assigned his rights under the fee
agreement to Express Recovery Services, which itself filed suit. Based upon the evidence
outlined above, the Panel concluded that Long referred for collection to Express Recovery
Services an account receivable of $6,600.00 arising under a fee agreement with respect to which
he was in fact owed nothing and had performed no services. The evidence does establish that
Express Recovery Services, not Long, was the party to the collection action. Rule 3.1 provides
that a lawyer "shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,"
without a basis in law or fact that is not frivolous. Mr. Long, as an attorney, knows or should
know that when an account receivable is assigned for collection, the collection agency will file an
action to recover upon it. Thus, when Long referred the fee agreement for collection, he knew or
should have known that an action would be filed against Shepard based upon it. Long, as an
attorney, also should have known that to recover in the collection agency's action, evidence
would be required that compensable services were rendered under the fee agreement. Thus,
Long knew or should have known that by virtue of his assigning the Shepard account for
collection, the agency would "bring . . . a proceeding" and "assert... an issue" [i.e., that
-5-

compensable legal services had been rendered]. Through assigning the account for collection,
Long in substance brought a proceeding and asserted therein that he had rendered compensable
services under the fee agreement, and there exists substantial evidence that this was not so.
Respondent Long has not carried his burden on this point to show that the Screening
Panel's recommendation was unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary,
capricious, and otherwise clearly erroneous.
3.

Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) Concerning Letterhead. The Screening Panel found that

Mr. Long violated these Rules by including on his letterhead the name "L. Long Lawyers" and
"Long & Associates" when there was not more than one attorney in the firm. Mr. Long's
Exception acknowledges committing a violation of these Rules. Although admitting that he
violated the Rules, he indicates that from time to time the firm has employed other lawyers.
Since Long concedes the violation, further discussion is unnecessary. At the Exception hearing,
Long's attorney argued that Long was in effect being punished twice for the same violation in
two cases ~ this case and in OPC No. 08-0080, with respect to which this violation was also
found. A review of both files indicates that the communications that are the subject of the two
cases are not the same — Long communicated with respect to the Shepard matter on inappropriate
letterhead with various parties and with completely different parties in case number 08-0080. In
addition, the time frames are different. With respect to this case, Mr. Long's communications
occurred in approximately the time frame of October, 2006 [see, for example, R. 31, 32],
whereas in OPC No. 08-0080, the use of the inappropriate letterhead was in the April, 2007 time
frame [R. 131 in that file] as well as April 28, 2008 [R. 61 in that file]. It appears that Long's use
of inappropriate letterhead was utilized with different people in different time frames and
therefore constitute separate violations. Concededly, they are separate violations of the same
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sort, but the issue in this case is whether the Screening Panel's decision should be sustained.
Respondent has not carried his burden on this point to show that its recommendation was
unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise clearly
erroneous.
RULING
Respondent has failed to carry his burden to establish under Rule 14-510(c) that the
Screening Panel's recommendation of an admonishment should be overturned. Respondent's
Exception is therefore denied.
DATED this

(?

day of November, 2009.
ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

c, Chair
State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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EXHIBIT E

BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

ORDER OF DISCIPLINE:
PUBLIC REPRIMAND

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:
Larry N. Long, #01989

Case No. 08-0049
Respondent.

This matter came on for hearing on February 19, 2009 before Screening Panel
"C-2" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court. The Chair of
the Ethics and Discipline Committee, having reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and the Recommendation of Discipline of the Screening Panel, and being fully
advised in the premises, hereby orders that Larry N. Long be and is hereby, PUBLICLY
REPRIMANDED for violating Rules 5.3(a) (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer
Assistants), Rule 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law)
and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
DATED this the

/S

d a y of /v*teWB&Z^

Ethics and Discipline Committee

, 200?.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the \!~J day of fJo iffinW 200^ I sent via United States
first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to:
Larry N. Long
c/o John A. Snow
36 S. State Street, Ste. 1900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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EXHIBIT F

BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:
Larry N. Long, #01989

Case No. 08-0049
Respondent.

The matter of the complaint by Gordon Nelson against Larry N. Long came on
for hearing before Screening Panel "C-2" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the
Utah Supreme Court on February 19, 2009.

Mr. Nelson did not appear, Mr. Long

appeared in person with Charles Gruber as counsel; and Barbara L. Townsend,
Assistant Counsel, appeared on behalf of the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional
Conduct ("OPC"). The Screening Panel recommends that Mr. Long be publicly
reprimanded

for violating

Rules

5.3(a)

(Responsibilities

Regarding

Nonlawyer

Assistants), Rule 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of
Law) and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The facts upon which the Screening Panel has concluded the record establishes
probable cause of misconduct and, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Long
should be publicly reprimanded are as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Mr. Long was hired by Mr. Nelson to represent David Merritt on a violation

of a Protective Order.
2.

Mr. Nelson originally met with Joe Scheeler, a non lawyer working for Mr.

Long, on April 18, 2007. Mr. Nelson paid a $750.00 retainer fee to Mr. Scheeler for Mr.
Long to represent Mr. Merritt.
3.

After Mr. Long failed to appear at a court hearing for Mr. Merritt, Mr.

Nelson called Mr. Long to inquire about his failure to appear and spoke to Mr. Scheeler.
4.

After Mr. Long failed to appear at the next hearing scheduled for Mr.

Merritt, Mr. Nelson called to speak with Mr. Long and again only spoke with Mr.
Scheeler.
5.

At one point, Mr. Scheeler planned to serve as a mediator for the parties

in this dispute, while Mr. Long represented Mr. Merritt and while he was employed by
Mr. Long.
6.

Mr. Scheeler prepared a mediation settlement document and sent it to

opposing counsel for signature.
7.

Mr. Nelson was led to believe that Mr. Scheeler was an attorney.

8.

At Mr. Merritt's second court hearing, Mr. Scheeler appeared to "represent

David" and tried to negotiate with the opposing party.
9.

Mr. Nelson only had contact with Mr. Scheeler and had the representation

agreement explained by Mr. Scheeler.
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10.

Mr. Long failed to effect measures to make reasonably certain that Mr.

Scheeler as his employee complied with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
11.

Mr. Long failed to adequately supervise Joe Scheeler's activities to insure

Mr. Scheeler was not engaging in the Unauthorized Practice of Law.
12.

Mr. Long allowed Mr. Scheeler to appear in court, contact opposing party

and conduct mediation proceedings at Mr. Long's office.
13.

Mr. Scheeler drafted a settlement agreement that Mr. Long ratified.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Rule 5.3(a) (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants))

1.

Rule 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants) states that

"With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer": (a) "a
partner and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possess comparable
managerial authority in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer. By failing to effect measures to
make reasonably certain that Mr. Long's employees complied with the Rules of
Professional Conduct Mr. Long violated this rule.
(Rule 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law))
2.

Rule 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of

Law) states that "A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the
regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so." By
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failing to adequately supervise Mr. Scheeler's activities to insure that Mr. Scheeler was
not engaging in the Unauthorized Practice of Law and by allowing Mr. Scheeler to hold
himself out as a lawyer, Mr. Long violated this rule.
(Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct))
3.

Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) This rule states: "It is professional misconduct for

a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly
assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another." By violating the
rules described above Mr. Long violated this rule.
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE
Based upon the foregoing, the Screening Panel recommends that Larry N. Long
be publicly reprimanded for violation of Rules 5.3(a) (Responsibilities Regarding
Nonlawyer Assistants), Rule 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdicitional
Practice of Law), and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconcuct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Matt Evans, Chair
Screening Panel "C-2"
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this

1-7

day of

\JpWm \>Qf

, 200^, I sent via

United States first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION FOR
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to:
Larry N. Long
c/o John A. Snow
36 S. State Street, Ste. 1900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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EXHIBIT G

BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of the Complaint of:
Gordon L. Nelson,
Complainant,

RULING ON EXCEPTION TO
SCREENING PANEL
RECOMMENDATION OF
DISCIPLINE

Against
Larry N. Long,

OPC File No. 08-0049

Respondent.

This matter is before the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 14-510(c) of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
on Respondent's Exception to a Screening Panel recommendation that Respondent receive a
public reprimand.
STANDARD FOR DECIDING RESPONDENT'S EXCEPTION
As to Exceptions, Rule 14-510(c) of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
states that "[t]he respondent shall have the burden of proof of showing that the recommendation
is unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitraiy, capricious and otherwise clearly
erroneous."
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
The Screening Panel Proceeding. The Screening Panel hearing occurred on February
19, 2009 before Screening Panel C-2. The Screening Panel determined that Mr. Long violated
Rule 5.3 through failing to make reasonable efforts to assure that the conduct of his non-lawyer

employee, Joe Scheeler ("Scheeler"), was compatible with Mr. Long's professional obligations
and that Mr. Long violated Rule 5.5 by failing adequately to supervise Mr. Scheeler to ensure
that Mr. Scheeler was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and to ensure that Mr.
Scheeler was not holding himself out as a lawyer. The Panel recommended that Mr. Long be
publicly reprimanded for these violations.
The Exception. OPC supplied Mr. Long with proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and a Recommendation of Discipline and a proposed Order of Discipline by letter dated July
7, 2009. Long, through Charles A. Gruber as his counsel, filed an Exception on July 23, 2009.
Thereafter, Mr. Gruber indicated his intention to call the Complainant at the Exception Hearing
and to cross-examine him. Mr. Gruber withdrew as Mr. Long's counsel by Notice of Withdrawal
dated September 22, 2009. John A. Snow of the Van Cott fmn entered his appearance as counsel
for Mr. Long and (i) withdrew Mr. Gruber's request to cross-examine the Complainant, (ii)
indicated that Mr. Long would not rely upon the documents Mr. Gruber filed with respect to the
Exception (other than procedurally to perfect the Exception), and (iii) on October 22, 2009 filed
Exceptions to Screening Panel's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation.
The Exception Hearing. The hearing of the Exception occurred on October 28, 2009
between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. Present at the hearing were the undersigned Chair, Barbara L.
Townsend, Assistant Counsel to OPC, Respondent Larry N. Long, and his counsel, John A.
Snow and Alex B. Leeman. Complainant was not present at the hearing. Respondent offered
argument concerning the Exception and OPC counsel also made statements during the Exception
hearing.
ANALYSIS OF EXCEPTION
The Screening Panel found that Long violated two specific ethical Rules: First, the Panel
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found that Long violated Rule 5.3 by failing to make reasonable efforts to ensure that there were
in effect measures reasonably assuring that the conduct of his assistant/office manager, Scheeler,
would be compatible with Long's legal obligations. Second, the Panel found that Long violated
Rule 5.5(a) by failing adequately to supervise Scheeler to ensure that he was not engaging in any
unauthorized practice of law and by allowing Scheeler to hold himself out as a lawyer. Because
the two are closely factually connected, they will be addressed together.
There is evidence in the record that Long employed Scheeler as his office manager for
some nine months. Included in Scheeler's responsibilities were interviewing clients and doing
paralegal work. In addition, Scheeler made himself available through Long's office to do
mediations. Long had a website which, under the heading "BAD ASS DEFENDERS" identified
Long as attorney, Scheeler as the "legal mediator," and Jim Kirkman as the "client manager." As
concerns the Complainant's interaction with Long's law office, the Complainant, Gordon Nelson
("Nelson"), stated that he hired Scheeler to represent his friend David Merritt, who was
incarcerated. Nelson testified that he contacted Long's office and spoke to Scheeler, who
negotiated with him the retainer amount, which Nelson paid to Scheeler. Nelson understood that
Scheeler was to appear at a hearing to attempt to get Merritt out of jail. No one from Long's
office took action or appeared at the scheduled hearing. Nelson again spoke with Scheeler at
Long's office, and Scheeler indicated that another $1,100.00 was required, which Nelson then
paid. Scheeler advised Nelson that he would handle the matter himself "as a mediator" between
Mr. Merritt and his accuser and would arrange to get Merritt out of jail. Scheeler appeared at a
Court hearing with Merritt and, on that occasion, communicated with Merritt's accuser, Debbie
Smith ("Smith"). In his dealings with Scheeler, Nelson believed that Scheeler was an attorney.
Scheeler is not a member of the Utah State Bar. Long later himself appeared at a Court hearing
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and advised Nelson that he would take the case for $3,000.00. Scheeler later conducted a
"mediation" between Merritt and Smith and drafted a "Settlement Agreement" between Merritt
and Smith.
The dates of some of the occurrences are pertinent. Long's office received a letter from
attorney Joseph Orifici dated May 2, 2007, which communicated that Orifici had been retained to
represent Smith concerning issues with Long's client David Merritt. Long's receipt of that letter
in that time frame suggests his knowledge of his own office's representation of Merritt veiy
shortly after Scheeler collected the first two fee installments from Nelson. Based upon Nelson's
payments to Long's office, it appears that Scheeler had his initial contacts with Nelson in the mid
to late April, 2007 time frame [R. 225-226]. The Settlement Agreement was prepared by
Scheeler and grew out of a mediation which occurred on June 1, 2007. After the mediation,
Long wrote a letter on June 11, 2007 to Michael Nielsen, the prosecutor on the Merritt case, in
which Long stated, "On June 1, 2007, David [Merritt] and the alleged victim VOLUNTARILY
COMPLETED a mediation with Joseph Scheeler and they are currently working on a settlement
and division of their property." [R. 141] Long's fee agreement [R. 31-32] is dated May 23,
2007 — after Scheeler took the original two payments and after Orifici's letter to Long. This
chronological sequence provides evidence that, first, Long knew that Orifici believed Long's
office was representing Merritt before Long, himself, claims to have entered into a fee agreement
and undertaken the representation - thereby suggesting that Long knew that there was some
contact between his office (through Scheeler) and Merritt before he, Long, actually entered into a
fee agreement relating to the Merritt representation. Second, it establishes that Long was aware
of the "mediation" and efforts to agree on a settlement and division of property, which was
apparently set forth in the Settlement Agreement that was prepared by Scheeler. Who did Long
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think was doing all of this for Merritt? Negotiating a division of property for Merritt after the
"mediation" constitutes the practice of law. It defies common sense that Long's office, through
Scheeler, could conduct a mediation aimed at a division of property and a resolution of issues
and negotiate about a division of property but that Long would be completely ignorant that
Scheeler had conducted such negotiations or prepared a Settlement Agreement relating to that
mediation. Long's letter suggests that he was aware that there was some agreement or
negotiation of an agreement relating to the matter. If there were negotiations or an agreement,
who did Long think was doing these things? He knew that he, the only lawyer in his office, was
not doing these things. There is substantial evidence to indicate that Long was aware that
Scheeler negotiated a property division and/or prepared the Settlement Agreement at least as of
June, 2007, but Scheeler remained employed by Long's office until November, 2007. Long
claims that his employment agreement with Scheeler precluded Scheeler's acting as an attorney.
Indeed, that is the thrust of Long's defense. But here there is substantial evidence that Long
knew of Scheeler's departure from such a restriction, yet Scheeler continued to be employed by
Long until November, when Scheeler terminated the relationship. Long, while stating that he did
not participate in the mediation, embraced and sought to take advantage of Scheeler's mediation
resolution, when Long knew that the other party (Smith) was represented and Long, himself,
knew that he had not appeared at the mediation to represent his client, negotiated a property
division, or prepared any agreement growing out of the mediation.
Long's Exception asserts that there is not substantial evidence to justify the Panel's
Recommendation. As outlined above, there is substantial evidence to establish both that
Scheeler was acting as a lawyer and that Long was aware that he was acting as a lawyer and,
indeed, sought to take advantage of Scheeler's improper actions through communications with
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the prosecutor in the case in which he was defending Merritt. In addition to what is outlined
above, the very fact that Scheeler could have acted as he did with Nelson and Merritt suggests a
lack of appropriate supervision. Scheeler's participation in the mediation and Settlement
Agreement, of which there is substantial evidence suggesting that Long was at least at some time
aware, and the fact that Long sought to capitalize upon these efforts in his representation of
Merritt suggests an approval or ratification of behavior prohibited by the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The misleading website is the website of Long & Associates ~ Long's law
office. A reasonable inference that material appeared on Long's own website for an extended
time is that he knew about it and did nothing timely to change it.
The Exception next asserts that the Findings of Fact are insufficient to justify the
Conclusions of Law. The Findings of Fact here enumerate instances on which Scheeler
functioned as an attorney, that Long was led to believe Scheeler was functioning as an attorney,
and matters bearing upon Mr. Long's failure to prevent these behaviors or to adequately
supervise Scheeler's activities. The Findings of Fact, although not entirely in evidentiary detail,
are sufficient to support the Conclusions of Law.
The Exception also argues that there is no evidence that Long failed properly to supervise
Scheeler and that the only evidence on that point is that it came from Long, who stated that he
did make reasonable efforts to supervise Scheeler's conduct, including requiring Scheeler to sign
an agreement in which Scheeler agreed not to practice law. Rule 5.3(a) requires that Long have
in effect measures making "reasonably certain" that Scheeler's conduct complied with the Rules
of Professional Conduct. Concededly, Long's written agreement with Scheeler is evidence that
he made some effort in that regard. This, however, is not a de novo review. On the other side of
the coin are the facts and chronology set forth above, which constitute substantial evidence that
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Long was aware of Scheeler's inappropriate conduct and failed both (i) to take measures to make
"reasonably certain" that Scheeler would not act in that way and (ii) after learning that Scheeler
was in fact acting inappropriately, to make "reasonably certain" that it would not happen again.
The Exception further argues that the mere fact that Scheeler conducted a mediation is
not evidence that Scheeler acted inappropriately. Long correctly notes that non-lawyers may
properly conduct mediations. Here, there is evidence that goes far beyond the mere conduct of a
mediation. First, Long knew that Scheeler was associated with his office and had interacted in
that capacity with a representative of the client in engaging Long's office as counsel. Scheeler
then purported to act as a mediator between the Long firm's client and his opponent -- plainly an
inappropriate act for a representative of Long's office given that Long represented one of the
parties to the mediation. Someone (presumably Scheeler) negotiated a property division for
Merritt with Smith or her counsel. Next, Scheeler prepared a Settlement Agreement, which he
supplied to opposing counsel, which was conceded by Long at the Exception hearing to
constitute the practice of law. Finally, Long became aware that the mediation had occurred
without his participation and that the mediation had been handled by Scheeler at his office. He
also knew at this time that the opposing party had been represented by counsel. Who was
representing Long's client at the mediation? Why was Long not involved in the mediation as
Merritt's counsel and why did Long not participate in the negotiations relating to the division of
property? There is substantial evidence that, at the very least at this point in time, Long had
knowledge that Scheeler was acting in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct but he then
communicated with the prosecutor that the mediation and settlement had occurred or were in
process and were factors favoring Merritt's position, vis-a-vis the prosecution.
Long's Exception finally argues that the Screening Panel's recommendation of a public
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reprimand is inappropriate because of the lack of injury component set forth in Rule 14-605 of
the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. There is evidence in the record to support the
presence of such injury. Some, but by no means all, evidence of such injury is as follows:
(i)

After Nelson engaged Scheeler to represent Merritt, Long did not appear at

a hearing and Merritt remained in jail.
(ii)

According to Nelson, he paid Long's office significant amounts for fees

through Scheeler, but Long performed insubstantial services.
(iii)

Long's client, Merritt, participated in a mediation proceeding handled by

Scheeler at which Merritt was unrepresented.
(iv)

Long's client, Merritt, was unrepresented in the negotiations relating to the

property division and/or the Settlement Agreement.
The injury to the legal system is self-evident when a person integrally connected with a law
office representing one party conducts a mediation between that office's client and the party
adverse to that client, but the law office's client is unrepresented at the mediation. Finally, there
exists injury to the legal system when a person holds himself out as qualified to practice law
without the requisite training and membership in the Bar.
Long has not carried his burden of showing that the Screening Panel's recommendation is
unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise clearly
erroneous.
RULING
Respondent has failed to carry his burden to establish under Rule 14-510(c) that the
Screening Panel's recommendation of a public reprimand should be overturned. Respondent's
Exception is therefore denied.
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DATED this

day of November, 2009.
ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

laak, Chair
State Street, Suite 800
Lake City, UT 84111
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EXHIBIT H

BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

:
:

Larry N. Long, #01989

:

ORDER OF DISCIPLINE:
PUBLIC REPRIMAND

Case No. 08-0080
Respondent.

:

This matter came on for hearing on February 19, 2009, before Screening Panel
"C-2" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court. The Chair of
the Ethics and Discipline Committee, having reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and the Recommendation of Discipline of the Screening Panel, and being fully
advised in the premises, hereby orders that Larry N. Long be and is hereby, PUBLICLY
REPRIMANDED for violating Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), 7.1 (Communications Concerning a
Lawyer's Services), 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of
the Rules of Professional Conduct.
DATED this the £ 4 d a y of KUvtHMfcEJfc-, 2009.

&pxvzfc. -Maak, Chair
^ ^ h t e s and Discipline Committee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _)

day of Ds'a/njyy, 2009 I sent via United States

first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to:
Larry N. Long
c/o John A. Snow
VanCott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy
36 S. State St. 19th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Respondent
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EXHIBIT I

BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

:

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND

Larry N. Long, #1989
Case No. 08-0080
Respondent.

The matter of the complaint by OPC against Larry N. Long came on for hearing
before Screening Panel "C-2" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah
Supreme Court on February 19, 2009. Mr. Long appeared in person with counsel,
Charles Gruber, and Barbara L. Townsend, Assistant Counsel, appeared on behalf of
the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"). The Screening Panel
recommends that Mr. Long be publicly reprimanded for violating Rules 1.5(a) (Fees),
7.1 (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(d)'(Firm Names and
Letterheads), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The facts upon which the Screening Panel has concluded the record establishes
probable cause of misconduct and, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Long
should be publicly reprimanded are as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Mr. Long charged excessive fees for the work he completed in the

Vantreese matter and the Perez Hernandez matter.
2.

At all times relevant to the conduct at issue, Mr. Long was the only lawyer

in his office.
3.

Mr. Long presented himself to the public using the names L. Long

Lawyers and Long & Associates.
4.

The use of these firm names led the public to conclude that there were

other lawyers in Mr. Long's office.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Rule 1.5(a) (Fees))
1

Rule 1.5(a) (Fees). This rule states: "A lawyer shall not make an agreement

for, charge or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The
factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following
1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 2) the likelihood, if apparent to the
client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment
by the lawyer; 3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 4)
the amount involved and the results obtained; 5) the time limitations imposed by the client
or by the circumstances; 6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client; 7) the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
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services; and 8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent" By charging excessive fees for
work he performed in two cases, Mr. Long violated Rule 1.5(a) (Fees).
(Rule 7.1 (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services))
2.

Rule 7.1 (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services). Under this

rule, "A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or
the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material
misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement
considered as a whole not materially misleading." By using the names L. Long Lawyers
and Long & Associates, Mr. Long misled the public and thereby violated Rule 7.1
(Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services).
(Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads))
3.

Rule 7.1 (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services). Under this

rule, "A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or
the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material
misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement
considered as a whole not materially misleading." By using the names L. Long Lawyers
and Long & Associates, Mr. Long's communications regarding his services were
misleading and he violated Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads).
(Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct))
4.

Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct). This rule states: I t is professional misconduct

for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly
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assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another." By violating the
aforementioned Rules of Professional Conduct, Mr. Long violated Rule 8.4(a)
(Misconduct).
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE
Based upon the foregoing, the Screening Panel recommends that Larry N. Long
be publicly reprimanded for violation of Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), 7.1 (Communications
Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads), and 8.4(a)
(Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

DATED this

Matttvans, Chair
Screening Panel "C-2"
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009.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this J

day of IhrP^b^r

, 2009, I sent via

United States first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION FOR
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to:
Larry N. Long
c/o John A. Snow
VanCott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy
36 S. State St. 19th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT84111
Attorney for Respondent
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EXHIBIT J

BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of the Complaint of:
Office of Professional Conduct,
Complainant,

RULING ON EXCEPTION TO
SCREENING PANEL
RECOMMENDATION OF
DISCIPLINE

Against
Larry N. Long,

OPC File No. 08-0080

Respondent.

This matter is before the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 14-510(c) of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
on Respondent's Exception to a Screening Panel recommendation that Respondent receive a
public reprimand.
STANDARD FOR DECIDING RESPONDENT'S EXCEPTION
As to Exceptions, Rule 14-510(c) of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
states that "[t]he respondent shall have the burden of proof of showing that the recommendation
is unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious and otherwise clearly
erroneous."
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
The Screening Panel Proceeding. The Screening Panel hearing occurred on February
19, 2009 before Screening Panel C-2. The Screening Panel determined that Mr. Long violated
Rule 1.5(a) through charging an unreasonable fee for services rendered and that he violated Rules

7.1 and 7.5(d) by placing on his letterhead "L. Long Lawyeis" or "Long & Associates," which
led the public to believe that more than one lawyer was affiliated with the firm when in fact there
was only one lawyer — Mr. Long. The Panel recommended that the Respondent be publicly
reprimanded for these violations.
The Exception. OPC supplied Mr. Long with proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and a Recommendation of Discipline and a proposed Order of Discipline by letter dated
June 16, 2009. Long, through Charles A. Gruber as his counsel, filed an Exception on July 1,
2009. Thereafter, Mr. Gruber indicated his intention to call the Complainant at the Exception
Hearing and to cross-examine him. Mr. Gruber withdrew as Mr. Long's counsel by Notice of
Withdrawal dated September 22, 2009. John A. Snow of the Van Cott firm entered his
appearance as counsel for Mr. Long and (i) withdrew Mr. Gruber's request to cross-examine the
Complainant, indicated that Mr. Long would not rely upon the documents Mr. Gruber filed with
respect to the Exception (other than procedurally to perfect the Exception), and on October 22,
2009 filed Exceptions to Screening Panel's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendation.
The Exception Hearing. The hearing of the Exception occurred on October 28, 2009
between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. Present at the hearing were the undersigned Chair, Barbara L.
Townsend, Assistant Counsel to OPC, Respondent Larry N. Long, John A. Snow, and Alex B.
Leeman. Complainant was .not present at the hearing. Respondent offered argument concerning
the Exception and OPC counsel also made statements during the Exception hearing.
ANALYSIS OF EXCEPTION
The Screening Panel found Respondent Larry N. Long ("Long") to have violated the
following Rules contained in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
-2-

1.

Long violated Rule 1.5(a) by charging an unreasonable fee for work he

performed on behalf of two clients: Vantreese and Hernandez.
2.

Long violated Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) through using the names L. Long

Lawyers and Long & Associates on letterhead and communication, which was misleading
because at the applicable times there was only one lawyer associated with the firm — Mr.
Long himself.
3.

Long violated Rule 8.4(a) by violating the Rules of Professional Conduct

noted above.
Based upon those violations, the Panel recommended that Long be publicly reprimanded.
The claims that Long charged an unreasonable fee to Vantreese, charged an unreasonable
fee to Hernandez, and used misleading letterhead will be addressed separately.
A.

Vantreese Fee Issue.

Vantreese retained Long to represent her in defending against a charge of possession with
intent to distribute, a second-degree felony, through a fee agreement dated April 5, 2007. The fee
agreement was a flat fee agreement in the amount of $8,910.00. The agreement provided that
this fee included representation "up to and including the pre-trial conference or Preliminary
Hearing and subsequent Sentencing upon entrance of a plea." Long states that he actually
received $8,900.00 on the Vantreese account. [R. 344] The Docket in the Vantreese matter
reflects that Long performed the following services [as will be discussed in greater detail below,
Long asserts that he performed services beyond those reflected in the Docket]: Mr. Long
appeared for a pre-trial conference on 12-4-06 and requested a continuance; on 1-22-07 Long
appeared at a pre-trial and requested a continuance; although it is unclear what Mr. Long did in
this regard, on January 25, 2007 Ms. Vantreese was accepted into Drug Court; on 2-26-07 Long
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appeared for a pre-trial conference with the case being continued; on 4-20-07 Long appeared for
a pre-trial conference; on 5-3-07 Long appeared for a Drug Court hearing; on 5-24-07 Long
appeared for a plea hearing at which Vantreese pleaded guilty. Thereafter, Vantreese appeared at
Drug Court on a regular basis, but Long did not appear again in the case. After completing Drug
Court successfully, the case against Vantreese was dismissed on 10-28-08.
At the Screening Panel hearing, Long was asked about and testified concerning what he
did on behalf of Vantreese. His testimony appears at pp. 38, et seq., in the transcript of the
Screening Panel hearing. Long testified that he met with Vantreese to determine her objectives
for his representation and that, thereafter, he performed the services outlined in the Docket as set
forth above. Long testified about his consideration of various legal strategies on behalf of
Vantreese, his review of the preliminary hearing tape, and his negotiations with the prosecutor,
George Voduc. Long testified that it was atypical for a defense attorney to attend Drug Court
cases, which accounted for his not attending Drug Court with Vantreese. Long testified that he
achieved all of the representation goals outlined for him, achieved a good result for his client,
and that his client never complained about the fees charged. Long submitted the Affidavit of
Gregory Skordas [T. 60], which Mr. Skordas outlines his qualifications, and that the flat fees
charged by Mr. Long in this case as well as the Hernandez case discussed below "are not
unreasonable for the representation undertaken and are consistent with fees being charged by
other attorneys in the Salt Lake City area for cases in which similar charges have been filed."
In addition to the transcript of the hearing, Long submitted extensive materials, prepared
by him after the subject Informal Complaint was filed, outlining a reconstruction of his activities
in the case. Mr. Long concludes that he spent 45 hours of work which, at a rate of $300.00 per
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hour, is a reasonable fee.1
In his Exception, Long first argues that its recommendation was not based upon
substantial evidence. The Screening Panel had before it both Long's description at the hearing of
the services he performed and the Docket's presentation of the court proceedings in which Mr.
Long participated. That evidence collectively establishes that Long appeared at several pre-trial
conferences that were seemingly uncomplicated ~ many merely involved a request for
continuance that was granted. Thereafter, Vantreese was accepted into Drug Court and Long
appeared one more time — again, for an insubstantial hearing. Long, in addition, offered
testimony of additional services, including consultations with his client, settlement negotiations
with the prosecution, and internal discussions of a strategy. Considering the court Docket's
enumeration of Long's involvement and Long's testimony at the hearing of what he did for
Vantreese, the Screening Panel could have concluded that Long spent an insubstantial amount of
time in the Vantreese representation. The court Docket combined with Long's testimony before
the Panel about what he did for Vantreese provide substantial evidence that he did not perform
services commensurate with the $8,900.00 fee that he charged and collected. The Screening
Panel was not obligated to believe Long's written retrospective accounting, supported with no
contemporaneous records that were introduced, of services he performed. The Screening Panel
could have chosen not to believe that retrospective accounting because it was seemingly
inconsistent with the Docket and Long's testimony at the hearing. In addition, as to most of the
additional tasks outlined in the retrospective accounting, there was no evidence introduced to the
effect that the tasks were necessary, that the products of the tasks were utilized, or that such

'Dividing $8,900.00 by 45 hours results in approximately a $200.00 hourly rate.
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products benefitted Vantreese in any way.
Fixed fee agreements are, concededly, permissible under the Code of Professional
Responsibility. That notwithstanding, any fixed fee that is charged must be reasonable in light of
the services actually performed giving consideration to the factors set forth in Rule 1.5. Thus,
the Affidavit of Gregory Skordas, while providing evidence that a fixed fee for the amount
charged by Mr. Long is reasonable does not address the second prong of the analysis — that is,
whether the fixed fee was reasonable in light of the services actually performed.
This is not a de novo review. The applicable standard requires that the Screening Panel's
decision be affirmed if there is any substantial evidence to support it. For the reasons set forth
above, the Chair concludes that there is substantial evidence from which the Screening Panel
could conclude as it did that Long charged an unreasonable fee with respect to the Vantreese
representation.
Long next argues in-his Exception that the Screening Panel's Findings of Fact are
insufficient to justify its conclusions of law. Long points out that Rule 14-510(b)(5)(E) requires
that its recommendation "state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses
and the basis upon which the Screening Panel has concluded . .. that the Respondent should
receive a public reprimand." Here, the Findings of Fact, although brief and not in evidentiary
detail, do state that Long charged excessive fees for his work on the Vantreese matter. Again,
although the Findings are not given in evidentiary detail, the Rule that Long violated, how he
violated that Rule (by charging unreasonable fees), and the representation involved (the
Vantreese representation) are all identified. What the Findings do not do is articulate the specific
evidence that the Screening Panel believed and disbelieved and the analytical process by which
the Panel came to the conclusion that Long overcharged Vantreese. The Chair does not believe
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that Findings at that level of detail are required by Rule 14-510(b)(5)(E).2
Long also suggests that the procedure followed by the OPC and the Screening Panel did
not give him reasonable notice of the charges against him. The Notice of Informal Complaint in
this matter [R. 38, et seq.] sets forth in substantial detail the potential violations and the basis for
those potential violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Long had ample notice of
the charges against him and the basis for those charges to enable him to prepare a defense.
Finally, Long's Exception argues that the Screening Panel made inconsistent findings
with respect to the Vantreese, Hernandez, and Kenney matters (all three of such matters being the
subject of a single Informal Complaint). Long argues that because the hourly rate on the
Vantreese and Hernandez matters (assuming Long's claim of the hours he spent on each matter
are accepted) were each $200.00 per hour and were found to be unreasonable, yet with respect to
the Kenney matter, where Long charged an effective rate of over $600.00 per hour, the Panel
found no unreasonable fee was charged, the Panel's results are inconsistent. To reach that
conclusion, one must assume that the Panel accepted Long's version of the work he performed
on each of these matters, a fact that does not appear in the record and which is inconsistent with
the Panel's findings.
B.

Hernandez Fee Issue.

Long was engaged to represent Hernandez pursuant to a fixed fee agreement dated March
26, 2007. The agreement provided for a fixed fee of $10,000.00 for representation through the
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The Screening Panel procedure contemplated by the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability, while containing provisions assuring due process and a reasonable record in the event
of an Exception, do not envision the level of detail and precision embraced with respect to civil
and criminal proceedings. Indeed, given the very nature of Screening Panel proceedings and the
volunteers who conduct them, such detail and precision would not be practical or feasible.
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pre-trial conference or preliminary hearing and subsequent sentencing upon entry of a plea. Mr.
Long states that he actually received $7,750.00 of that amount.
The court Docket in the Hernandez matter indicates the following activities of Mr. Long:
On March 23, 2007, Mr. Long made an initial appearance; on April 12, 2007, Mr. Long appeared
at a roll call that was continued; on April 23, 2007, Mr. Long filed an appearance of counsel, a
request for discovery, and a motion to preserve evidence; on May 31, 2007, Long appeared and
advised the court that Hernandez had been accepted into Drug Court; on 6-28-07 Long appeared
for a change of plea hearing that was continued; on July 5, 2007, Long appeared for a change of
plea hearing. Hernandez appeared thereafter over an extended period for Drug Court. Mr. Long
did not appear at any of these hearings.
Long's testimony at the hearing before the Screening Panel reflects that Long performed
the following services in the Hernandez matter [Transcript pp. 60, et seq.]: Mr. Long testified
that he prepared a request for discovery and a motion to preserve evidence (both appear to be
form documents), that he participated in a plea in abeyance as a result of Hernandez being
accepted by the Drug Court, and that he did not appear for Drug Court hearings with Hernandez
because that is not typically done by defense counsel. Mr. Long testified that his client was
satisfied with his representation and did not ask for any refund. Mr. Long submitted an
accounting as to his activities on the Hernandez case [R. 64, et seq.]. The accounting was
prepared after the Informal Complaint and is not based on contemporaneously prepared
documents that were placed in the record. Mr. Long asserts that he believes he spent 50-60 hours
of time representing Hernandez which, when divided into the actual fee charged of $7,750.00,
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yields an estimated hourly fee of $300.00 per hour.3
Mr. Long's Exception to the excessive fee violation with respect to the Hernandez matter
tracks his Exception with respect to the Vantreese matter outlined above. With respect to his
assertion that there is no substantial evidence to justify the Screening Panel's recommendation,
the analysis is much the same as with respect to the Vantreese matter. The Docket and testimony
offered by Mr. Long at the Screening Panel hearing both indicate that Mr. Long did very limited
work for the fee he charged. The Screening Panel was not required to accept the accounting
submission prepared by Mr. Long after the Informal Complaint against him was submitted.
Based upon the content of the Docket and the testimony offered, there is substantial evidence to
support the Screening Panel's recommendations. Also, as was the case with Vantreese, with
respect to most of the additional tasks outlined in Long's post-Initial Complaint accounting, there
was no evidence introduced that the tasks were necessary, that the products of the tasks were
utilized, or that such products benefitted Hernandez in any way.
This is not a de novo review. The applicable standard requires that the Screening Panel's
decision be affirmed if there is any substantial evidence to support it. For the reasons set forth
above, the Chair concludes that there is substantial evidence from which the Screening Panel
could conclude as it did that Long charged an unreasonable fee with respect to the Hernandez
representation.
The Exception further asserts that the Screening Panel failed to articulate sufficient
Findings of Fact which would justify its Conclusions of Law. In this regard, the analysis of this
aspect of the Exception mirrors that set forth above with respect to the Vantreese matter. The

3

Dividing $7/750.00 by 55 hours (he claims 50-60) yields approximately $140.00 per

hour.
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reasons there stated, the Findings of Fact, while not in evidentiary detail, are sufficient to justify
the Conclusions of Law. Further, like the Vantreese matter, the Notice of Informal Complaint
gave Mr. Long adequate information about the charges against him to enable him to prepare a
defense. The Exception's assertion of inconsistency is also treated above in connection with the
Vantreese matter.
C.

Violations of Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d).

The Screening Panel found that Long presented himself to the public using the names
L. Long Lawyers and Long & Associates and that the use of these firm names led the public to
conclude that there were other lawyers in Mr. Long's office besides Mr. Long himself. Long
conceded at the Screening Panel hearing that, although from time to time Long employed lawyers
besides himself, throughout the time period that his letterhead suggested that there were more
than one lawyer in his office, there were times that Mr. Long was the only lawyer. See
Transcript, pp. 15, et seq. The Exception concedes a violation of these Rules, but suggests that
because the violation was innocent and because of the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive,
the recommended discipline should be reduced (presumably from a public reprimand to an
admonishment). As described above in Sections A and B, apart from the violation of Rules 7.1
and 7.5(d), there is substantial evidence that Long violated Rule 1.5. If one accepts that there
was substantial evidence that Long charged an unreasonable fee to his clients, existence of
damage to the client is self-evident. That being so, the elements of a public reprimand set forth
in Rule 14-605(c) exist and public reprimand is an appropriate sanction even in the absence of a
violation of Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d).
D.

Long's Claim of Inconsistency Between Separate OPC Cases.

Long's Exception argues that the conclusions arrived at in various identified cases against
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Long4 are inconsistent. Concededly, consistency is a goal in the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions "for the same or similar offenses." Rule 14-602(d)(3). For the following reasons, this
argument is not a basis for rejecting the Screening Panel's recommendation here. First, each of
the cases identified by Long involves different parties, different facts, and different
circumstances. Long has not shown that, based upon the Panel's findings in each separate case,
the conclusions of the Panel are not consistent. Second, with respect to this specific matter and
this Exception, Long has the burden of proof showing that the recommendation was
unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise clearly
erroneous. That Long may -have been disciplined less severely in another case that he identifies
is not a basis for granting the Exception here — the issue rather is whether in this matter, the
recommendation is inappropriate under the standard set forth in Rule 14-510(c). For the reasons
outlined above, Long failed to cany his burden in that regard.
RULING
Respondent has failed to cany his burden to establish under Rule 14-510(c) that the
Screening Panel's recommendation of a public reprimand should be overturned. Respondent's
Exception is therefore denied.

4

These cases include this case and cases numbered OPC File Nos. 08-0049 and 07-0497.
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